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I. Introduction
The ouster of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in
January 2011 triggered a concatenation of protests,
demonstrations, and other forms of civil resistance across the
Middle East.' This revolutionary wave, termed the "Arab Spring"
by the media,2 brought millions together in a grassroots effort to
promote democratic reforms, the recognition of human rights and,
in some cases, the overthrow of longstanding oppressive regimes.3
The movement has led to the toppling of governments in Egypt,4
Yemen,s and Libya,6 in addition to the Ben Ali regime in
Tunisia.' It has also triggered other conflicts that remain ongoing,
I For an interactive timeline of the events of the Arab Spring, see Garry Blight,
Sheila Pulham & Paul Torpey, Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East
Protests, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/
2011 /mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline; see also Kareem Fahim, Slap to a
Man's Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at Al (recounting the
revolution-triggering confrontation between a street vendor and Tunisian authorities);
Lin Noueihed, Peddler's Martyrdom Launched Tunisia's Revolution, REUTERS (Jan. 19,
2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/uk-tunisia-protests-bouazizi-idUKTRE70
17TV20110119 (recounting the same).
2 See Joshua Keating, Who First Used the Term Arab Spring?, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/1 1/04/who-first-used-the_
termarab spring (tracing the origin of the term "Arab Spring").
3 See generally Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the
Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 3 (May-June 2011)
(contrasting the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya).
4 See Leila Fadel, With Peace, Egyptians Overthrow a Dictator, WASH. PosT
(Feb. I1, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/1l/
AR2011021105709.html.
5 See Laura Kasinof, Yemen Swears In New President to the Sound ofApplause,
and Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at A9.
6 See David Batty, Libya Prepares for Liberation Ceremony, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/oct/22/libya-liberation-
ceremony-nato-withdrawal.
7 See Liz Sly & Leila Fadel, Overthrow of Tunisian President Jolts Arab Region,
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2011, at Al1. Notably, economic sanctions were not a part of the
formal U.S. response to the civil unrest in Bahrain, Tunisia and Yemen. Jeff Lord, Kay
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most notably President Bashar al-Assad's crackdown against
opposition groups in Syria.'
Like Syria, many of the governments in power responded to
the events of the Arab Spring with oppressive violence.9 The
resulting conflicts elicited a range of responses from the Western
world, from diplomatic missions"0 to direct military intervention."
A central element of the West's response, however, has been the
use of economic sanctions. 2 Economic sanctions involve the
deliberate withdrawal of normal economic relations between a
sanctioning governmental body and a target country, government,
entity, or individual in order to coerce the target to modify its
behavior in a manner consistent with the sanctioning body's
foreign policy goals.13
Georgi & Michael Burton, The Arab Spring and OFAC's Targeted Sanctions, in COPING
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 273, 275 (2011).
8 See infra notes 213-218 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Angela Shah, Bahrain's Violent Crackdown Hardens Opposition,
TIME (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2051421,00.html;
Adam Tanner & Souhail Karam, Many Wounded as Moroccan Police Beat Protestors,
REUTERS (May 23, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/22/uk-morocco-protests-
idUKTRE74L2YU20110522.
10 See, e.g., Nour Malas & Joe Lauria, UN., 'Friends' Pursue New Tracks on
Syria, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2012, at A7 (reporting the U.N.'s appointment of Kofi
Annan as an envoy to Syria).
I See Oliver Holmes, In Tripoli, NA TO Chief Hails "Free Libya," REUTERS (Oct.
31, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-libya-idUSTRE79S34620
111031.
12 See John Boscariol et al., Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 46 INT'L
LAW. 23, 34-38 (2012) (discussing Arab Spring-related sanctions from the United States
and Canada); see also Lord, et al., supra note 7, at 273 ("Throughout 2011, trade lawyers
and industry attempted to keep pace with a seemingly constant flow of sanctions,
licenses, revised licenses, revoked licenses, statements of licensing policy, and new
regulations, all seeking to address and influence the rapidly moving political
developments in the Arab world .... ).
13 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 3 (3d
ed. 2009) (defining economic sanctions similarly in the seminal study on the effective
use of sanctions); see also Elenor Lissel, Economic Sanctions Within the European
Union Towards Non-Member States 17 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) available at
http://lup.lub.1u.se/student-papers/record/1338188/file/1646128.pdf ("[S]anctions can be
defined as a coercive foreign policy or trade policy. . . used to achieve certain political
objectives [by] disrupting . .. normal relations with another actor or target."); Justin D.
Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 115, 119 n.17 (2003)
(comparing various definitions of sanctions).
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Sanctions vary greatly in scope and objective. At one end of
the continuum, a sanctioning government may attempt to force
complete regime change through a comprehensive embargo on
trade with the target.14 At the other end, a surgical effort to freeze
the assets of a single government official or other individual or
entity may be employed to influence a change in policy."
United States commitment to economic sanctions originated in
the aftermath of World War I. With the atrocities of that conflict
fresh in the minds of the American public, President Woodrow
Wilson championed sanctions as a potential alternative to all-out
war.'" Since that time, the United States has been the predominant
force on the international sanctions scene, leveraging its
considerable economic power in pursuit of a variety of foreign
policy objectives." The U.S. economic sanctions regime utilizes a
variety of techniques, from embargoes to reductions in foreign
aid.'" Perhaps the most prominent of such techniques are the trade
restrictions and asset freezes that compose the twenty-two
sanctions programs currently administered by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a component of the Department
14 See, e.g., infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. sanctions
against Cuba); infra Part III.A (discussing the same).
15 See, e.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 139 (discussing a U.N. Security
Council ban on the sale of luxury goods to North Korea in response to that country's
October 2006 nuclear test, which was tailored to annoy North Korean leader Kim Jong-II
who was known to enjoy "Hennessy cognac, iPods, Harley Davidson motorcycles, and
plasma televisions").
16 See id at 1 ("Speaking in Indianapolis in 1919, President Wilson said: 'A nation
that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful,
silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does
not cost a life outside the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure upon the nation which,
in my judgment, no modem nation could resist."' (citing SAUL K. PADOVER, WILSON'S
IDEALS 108 (1942))); see also Radka DrulikovA et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of EU
Sanctions Policy, 4 CENT. EUR. J. INT'L & SEC. STUD. 101, 103 (2010) ("(T]he
effectiveness, success and/or utility of economic sanctions and their importance among
foreign policy tools have been discussed extensively since the times of the US President
Woodrow Wilson .... ).
17 See infra Part III; see also infra note 32 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (describing the Cuba
embargo); infra note 115 (describing the counternarcotics certification program); see
also HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 133-34 (describing the President's broad
sanctioning authority under various statutes).
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of the Treasury.' 9 For the past fifty years, OFAC has been the
agency through which the U.S. government has implemented its
sanctions regime.20
OFAC employs a myriad of restrictive measures to effectuate
U.S. sanctions strategy. Many of its sanctions programs make use
of targeted or "smart" sanctions, which freeze the assets of and
restrict trade with designated individuals and entities, such as
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), narcotics
traffickers, and terrorists and their supporters.2' Other smart
sanctions target persons who threaten democratic processes within
a particular country or region, such as Liberia, the Western
Balkans, and the Congo.22 OFAC is best known, however, for its
"holistic"23 sanctions that target specific countries or their
governments, such as Cuba, Iran, and Syria, and impose broad-
19 See Harry Wolf, Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy
Tool or Ineffective Hindrance on American Businesses?, 6 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 329,
329-30 (2006) ("During the latter decades of the twentieth century, the United States
increasingly dealt with difficult areas of foreign policy through the implementation of
economic sanctions programs, many of which have been in place for years and remain
operative today."); see also Alan Einisman, Note, Ineffectiveness at Its Best: Fighting
Terrorism with Economic Sanctions, 9 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 299, 304-05 (2000)
(discussing the United States' frequent use of economic sanctions).
20 See generally infra Part II.C (discussing the establishment of OFAC).
21 See, e.g., Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Jan. 12, 2013); see also infra note 232 and accompanying text. Targeted or
"smart" sanctions are intended to focus their impact on leaders, political elites, and
segments of society believed to be responsible for objectionable behavior, while
simultaneously reducing collateral damage to the general population and to third
countries." Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy
Alternative?, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 11, 12 (2000) [hereinafter Hufbauer & Oegg,
Targeted Sanctions].
22 See infra note 231.
23 The term "holistic" is used to refer to sanctions programs that employ broad
restrictions on trade up to and including a comprehensive embargo. Targeted asset
freezes may nonetheless be a component of a holistic program, particularly where such
measures block a government's assets or the assets of a significant number of entities
operating in a given industry, as the United States has done in Iran. See infra notes 168-
184 and accompanying text. Cf Hufbauer & Oegg, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 21,
at 12 ("'Selective' sanctions, which are less broad than comprehensive embargoes,
involve restrictions on particular products or financial flows. 'Targeted' sanctions focus
on certain groups or individuals within the targeted country and aim to impact these
groups directly. As a result, there is some overlap between these two concepts."
(internal citation omitted)).
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based, categorical restrictions on doing business with those
countries.24
The U.S. experience, both historically and in connection with
the events of the Arab Spring, has revealed significant challenges
attendant to the holistic sanctions programs that are fundamental
to its strategic approach.2 5 Comprehensive trade restrictions can
create conflict-of-law scenarios for businesses operating within the
sanctioned country as well as preclude activities that are deemed
benign and not inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy.26 They can
also impose an excessive hardship on innocent citizens and
businesses in the targeted countries whose interests the United
States is trying to protect by imposing sanctions in the first place.27
To control for these excesses, OFAC employs a robust licensing
practice. 28 Licensing involves the exemption of certain categories
of transactions or, upon application, specific transactions that
would otherwise run afoul of government sanctions.29
This Article examines the role an effective licensing program
like OFAC's plays in the success of an economic sanctions
strategy. The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II traces the
history of the U.S. sanctions regime and the policy considerations
that shaped its evolution, from the use of sanctions as an
instrument of war through their development into a versatile
foreign policy tool. Part III reviews modem U.S. sanctions policy,
in which the United States has implemented a diversified, flexible
strategy that includes everything from Cold War-carryover
measures to new efforts targeting narcotics trafficking,
24 See infra notes 226-231 and accompanying text. In order to fully effectuate the
foreign policy objectives of its sanctions programs, particularly in a complex global
environment where it is impossible to predict all types of activity and evasive actions
that may be taken and the necessary responses thereto, the United States often formulates
comprehensive sanctions with broad assertions of jurisdiction. R. Richard Newcomb,
Targeted Financial Sanctions: The U.S. Model, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 41, 46 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002); see
also Telephone Interview with Robert Werner, former Director of OFAC, (Dec. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter Werner Interview].
25 See generally Lord et al., supra note 7, at 273 (reviewing the successes of the
U.S. sanctions program).
26 See infra Part IV.D.2.
27 See id.
28 Parts IV.C.1-2.
29 See infra notes 267-269 and accompanying text.
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international crime, and terrorism. Part IV discusses how OFAC
administers the U.S. sanctions programs. It pays particular
attention to OFAC's licensing practices and demonstrates, by
reference to historical conflicts and recent lessons emerging from
the Arab Spring, how licensing fosters three "core competencies"
that are essential to address the risks inherent in holistic sanctions
programs: flexibility, the ability to mitigate collateral damage, and
adaptability.3 0 The Article concludes by predicting that
multinational bodies like the European Union and the Arab
League increasingly will join the United States in resorting to
holistic sanctions in response to civil unrest around the world. The
Article argues that the success of such efforts, and of any
economic sanctions regime, will depend upon establishing an
infrastructure that promotes the achievement of the three core
competencies.
II. OFAC and the Evolution of the U.S. Sanctions Regime
Although the United States is far from the first state to have
availed itself of sanctions as a coercive tactic,3 1 it has largely
driven the evolution of global sanctions for almost a century.3 2
While the precise nature and objectives of its sanctions strategy
have changed over time, the United States' reliance upon sanctions
has remained constant. 33
30 See infra Part III.D.
31 Most scholars trace the use of economic sanctions to Ancient Greece, with the
most well-known case being Pericles's Megarian Decree, enacted in 432 B.C. shortly
before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, which banned the Megarians from
Athenian seas, lands, and markets. See, e.g., KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (2009); HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 9-10; MICHAEL P.
MALLOY, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2001); Barry
E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1168 n.18 (1987).
32 A well-known study on the effectiveness of economic sanctions found that the
United States, alone or with its allies, was responsible for 109 out of 174 recorded cases
of economic sanctions from 1914-2000. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 17.
Other originators of sanctions programs did not come close to that total. See id.
(reporting 20 cases of U.N. sanctions, 16 cases by the U.K., and 14 cases by the EU).
These tallies do not include cases where the originator participated as a member of an
international organization such as the U.N. or EU. Id.
33 Consider Thomas Jefferson's pronouncement in 1808 that in foreign relations,
"three alternatives alone are to be chosen from. 1. Embargo. 2. War. 3. Submission and
tribute." Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. President, to Benjamin Lincoln, Lieutenant
2013 735
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A. Early Sanctions Efforts
The United States's earliest foray into economic sanctions
dates back to the run-up to the War of 1812. The United States,
then a fledgling nation, found itself stuck between Great Britain
and France as those countries vied for global dominance." In an
effort to protect U.S. vessels from French and British navies and
privateers, and to put economic pressure on Britain,3 6  President
Thomas Jefferson successfully promoted the passage of the
Governor of Mass. (Nov. 13, 1808), in 4 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND
MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 116, 116 (Thomas Jefferson
Randolph ed., 1829). Nearly two hundred years later, then-Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, reasserted Jefferson's pithy
summation of U.S. foreign policy in defending the U.S. sanctions regime against charges
of epidemicity by business lobbyists:
There are, indeed, three tools in foreign policy: diplomacy, sanctions, and war.
Take away sanctions and how can the United States deal with terrorists,
proliferators, and genocidal dictators? Our options would be empty talk or
sending in the marines. Without sanctions, the United States would be virtually
powerless to influence events absent war. Sanctions may not be perfect and
they are not always the answer, but they are often the only weapon.
Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic? U.S. Business' Curious Crusade, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 2, 5.
34 See OFAC: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, at 2, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx
(last updated Dec. 19, 2012 1:02 PM). [hereinafter OFAC FAQ]. Depending on how
one is willing to define "U.S." economic sanctions, the earliest instance may be the
American colonists' boycott of English goods in response to the 1765 Stamp Act and
later taxation attempts by the British government. See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 12-
13 (labeling the boycotts as "the first significant U.S. economic sanctions").
35 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1647-55
(2007) (discussing the systematic interference with neutral American commerce caused
by tensions between Britain and France).
36 The Embargo Act was a response to the harassment of U.S. vessels by French
and British ships. See id at 1647-55 (discussing the historical context of the passage of
the Embargo Act). Since the American Revolution, the British navy had been interfering
with American shipping through seizures and the impressment of American sailors. Id.
at 1647-48. Franco-British warfare also led to disruptions of American shipping. Id. at
1648. By 1807, actions taken by the governments of both countries "had made virtually
any U.S. vessel on the high seas fair game for the British or French navies, or for
privateers acting under British or French authority." Id. Although the attacks on
American ships were acts of war by any standard, then-President Jefferson saw military
conflict with Great Britain or France (or both) as an undesirable last resort due not only
to the military might of those countries but also to reductions in the American military
by his administration. Id
736
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Embargo Act of 1807." The Embargo Act was monumental in
scope." It prohibited every U.S. vessel from departing for any
foreign port without the express approval of the President.39  The
Act was ultimately a political disaster for the Jefferson
administration, however, as its total ban on international trade
required increasingly draconian enforcement methods.40 Congress
ultimately repealed the Embargo Act only three months after
enacting its severest enforcement provisions.4 1
37 An Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports and Harbors
of the United States (Embargo Act), ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (1807) (repealed 1809).
38 Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1647 ("Indeed, the scope of the embargo and the
powers that it gave the executive branch over American commerce make the Interstate
Commerce Act's attempts at regulating the railroad industry seem almost pathetic by
comparison.").
39 Embargo Act § 1. Additionally, ships traveling from one U.S. port to another
were required to first post a bond equal to twice the value of their cargo, guaranteeing
that the ship would reland in another U.S. port. Id. § 2. Jefferson's backing of such an
enormous piece of legislation is striking given his historical persona as an advocate for a
limited federal government. See Colleen J. Shogan, The Moralist and the Cavalier: The
Political Rhetoric of Washington and Jefferson, 28 N. KY. L. REv. 573, 587-92 (2001)
(discussing the tensions between Jefferson's political writings, personal letters, and
presidential actions).
Merchants viewed the "presidential approval" caveat as empowering the
President to grant exemptions at will; Jefferson was accordingly inundated with
applications. Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1660. Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury
Albert Gallatin responded by construing the statute narrowly to allow for exceptions only
when a private voyage was necessary to carry on government business. Id at 1660-61.
Gallatin's involvement with the Embargo Act presaged the Treasury's role in
implementing and enforcing U.S. sanctions thereafter. OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 2.
For a comprehensive discussion of Jefferson's and Gallatin's "reluctant" administration
of the Embargo Act, see Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1657-85.
40 See Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1650-55 (discussing the Embargo Act's statutory
history); see also John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 443-
453 (2008) (tracking the increasingly severe and ultimately unsuccessful actions taken
by the Jefferson administration to enforce the Embargo Act). Although the original
penalty for violating the Embargo Act was the forfeiture of one's bond, supplemental
legislation strengthened the Act's penalties to include the forfeiture of one's ship and
cargo or, if either was unavailable, a fine equal to double their combined value.
Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1651. Additionally, anyone knowingly involved in a
prohibited foreign voyage was subject to a fine ranging from $1000 to $20,000. Id
Owners of violating ships were effectively barred from foreign trade. See id at 1651
n.65.
41 Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1655; see also Yoo, supra note 40, at 451-52.
Congress replaced the Embargo Act with substantially milder legislation banning
imports from Great Britain and France. Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1655; see also An
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Despite this early failure, the U.S. government continued to
see economic sanctions as a tool of war.42 During the American
Civil War, for example, the Union enforced a crippling blockade
against the Confederate States, which amplified the North's
advantages in sea power, railroads, material wealth, and industrial
capacity to produce iron and munitions.4 3 Congress also passed a
law prohibiting transactions with the Confederacy and calling for
the forfeiture of goods involved in such transactions.44
Several decades later, in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War, President Theodore Roosevelt, utilizing his
authority under a joint congressional resolution, banned the export
of arms and ammunition to the Dominican Republic for the
purpose of protecting a U.S. receivership over Dominican customs
houses.45
Act to Interdict the Commercial Intercourse Between the United States and Great Britain
and France, and Their Dependencies; and for Other Purposes, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528 (1809).
42 See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 12-15 (describing the difficulties of the
Embargo Act and the continued, more effective use of sanctions during World War I).
43 Id. at 13; see also HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 40 tbl.1A.3.
44 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 2. The law also provided for a licensing program,
to be implemented through rules and regulations by the Treasury Department, whereby
certain otherwise prohibited transactions with the South would be allowed. Id. This was
an early recognition of the fact that that a licensing program can provide needed leniency
in a comprehensive sanctions program. Today, the existence of OFAC's broad licensing
practice confirms the enduring truth of that recognition.
45 ALLEN W. DULLES & HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, CAN WE BE NEUTRAL? 162
(Books for Libraries Press 1971) (1936); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 13
(characterizing this act as "the beginning of a policy of applying arms export restrictions
and economic sanctions in order to promote political stability and U.S. interests in Latin
America and China"). Roosevelt was concerned that political unrest in the Caribbean
and Central America would present European nations with the opportunity to "gain a
greater foothold in the region." David Gartner, Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine,
and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. REv. 499, 513 (2012). A strong proponent of the
Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt made it known that the United States was willing to
intervene in the affairs of neighboring countries when necessary to preserve "the ties of
civilized society." Id. at 514. With regard to the Dominican Republic, he feared that
Europeans would resort to force to resolve outstanding debts, potentially through the
occupation of Santo Domingo. Id. at 518. Roosevelt's solution was to negotiate a U.S.
receivership over the Dominican customs houses to relieve the country of pressure from
its foreign creditors. DULLES & ARMSTRONG, supra, at 162; see also Gartner, supra, at
518-19. The 1905 arms embargo was aimed at preventing these financial arrangements
from being disturbed by revolution. DULLES & ARMSTRONG, supra, at 162.
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B. TWEA and the Office of Foreign Funds Control
Though the United States continued to employ sanctions as a
wartime measure well into the twentieth century, concurrent
developments in the legal framework for sanctions would provide
the basis for the later expansion of the use of sanctions as an
alternative, rather than a mere complement, to traditional
warfare.46 This expansion began during World War I, with the
enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA).47
Before TWEA, the President lacked the authority to quickly
impose restrictions on foreign states and nationals in the event of
an emergency. 48 Enacted on the day that Congress declared war
on Germany, TWEA was a response to this lack of authority. 49 Its
purpose was to allow the President, in rapid fashion, to prevent the
nation's enemies from accessing assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction
and using such assets to harm U.S. interests.o
As originally conceived, TWEA gave the President authority
to impede the transactions of enemy states during times of war.
Although the statute clearly restricted exercise of that power to
wartime and exempted purely domestic transactions, in 1933
President Franklin Roosevelt invoked his authority under TWEA
46 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 10 ("Only after World War I was
extensive attention given to the notion that economic sanctions might substitute for
armed hostilities as a stand-alone policy."); see also infra Part II.D (introducing the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act).
47 Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a). TWEA contained essentially the same
economic controls used in the U.K.'s Trading with the Enemy Act of 1915, which
imposed a total blockade against Germany in response to German submarine warfare.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 15 & n. II ("The blockade covered all German trade,
ignoring distinctions between types of contraband. Enforcing the blockade was difficult
because of the hazards of inspecting ships on the high seas.").
48 James J. Savage, Executive Use of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act-Evolution Through the Terrorist and Taliban Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 28, 29 (2001); Bethany Kohl Hipp, Comment, Defending Expanded
Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign Assets and Transactions, 17 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 1311, 1318 (2003).
49 Roger 1. Roots, Government by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History
of the New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 292 n.93 (2000); Savage,
supra note 48, at 29; Hipp, supra note 48, at 1316-19.
50 Savage, supra note 48, at 29; Hipp, supra note 48, at 1318-19.
51 Savage, supra note 48, at 29; Hipp, supra note 48, at 1318-19.
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to order a bank holiday at the height of the Great Depression.52 In
response to the President's declared emergency and public
pressure resulting from bank closures, Congress ratified
retroactively the President's actions by passing the Emergency
Banking Relief Act (EBA)." Among other things, the EBA
authorized the President to restrict trade during peacetime national
emergencies, removed the restriction to foreign transactions, and
eliminated every reference to "enemy" in TWEA.54 Congress's
52 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 93; Hipp, supra note 48, at 1319-20; see also
MALLOY, supra note 31, at 152 ("TWEA was later invoked, with virtually no textual
support, as a basis for President Roosevelt's 'Banking Holiday' declaration of a state of
emergency in 1933."). The holiday, which Roosevelt imposed from March 6, 1933, to
March 9, 1933, forbade banks from processing gold, silver, or currency transactions,
from "tak[ing] any other action which might facilitate the hoarding thereof," and from
paying out deposits, making loans, or "transact[ing] any other banking business
whatsoever." Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1690 (Mar. 6, 1933), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 14661. Attempting to justify the
apparent absence of a foreign nexus to action taken under TWEA, President Roosevelt
claimed that speculation in foreign exchanges was draining U.S. stocks of gold. Hipp,
supra note 48, at 1320. Roosevelt did not attempt to explain the lack of a wartime nexus,
though he later defended his decision to invoke TWEA to declare a peacetime national
emergency on the grounds that something had to be done, even if he had no specific
authorization to take such action. Id. at 1321. Roosevelt's real objective in purchasing
gold was to inflate agricultural commodity prices. Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis
Management, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1051, 1090 (2009); see also Kenneth W. Dam, From the
Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary
Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 509-14 (1983) (chronicling Roosevelt's efforts to eliminate
the gold standard).
53 Emergency Banking Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1, ch. 1 (1933);
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 93; Hipp, supra note 48, at 1321. Congress did so,
moreover, only three days after Roosevelt declared the emergency. Id. The legislative
intent behind the Act remains unclear, as the bill was apparently passed unread by many
congressmen in a haste born from public pressure commensurate with a four-day,
government-ordered bank closure. See Roots, supra note 49, at 266-67 (discussing the
expedited passage of the Emergency Banking Relief Act).
54 Hipp, supra note 48, at 1321-22; see Emergency Banking Relief Act § 2. The
Act also amended the Federal Reserve Act to empower the Secretary of the Treasury to
order individuals and organizations to exchange their gold for American currency.
Roots, supra note 49, at 268; Emergency Banking Relief Act § 3. The day after
Congress passed the EBA, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6073, which prohibited the
removal of gold from the United States. See Exec. Order No. 6073 (Mar. 10, 1933),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14507. A month later,
Roosevelt ordered persons owning gold in the United States to deliver such gold to the
Federal Reserve in exchange for U.S. currency. See Exec. Order No. 6102 (Apr. 5,
1933), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=14611&st-
&stl=.
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rush to action produced a dramatic expansion of the President's
national emergency powers, giving the President broad discretion
to define national emergencies and craft responses thereto, actions
over which Congress retained virtually no oversight."
TWEA was the first modem version of U.S. sanctions
legislation. TWEA also provided the original basis for the
establishment of a sanctioning agency within the U.S. Department
of the Treasury." Although the involvement of the Secretary of
the Treasury in implementing economic sanctions dates back to
the Embargo Act," a Treasury division specializing in
administering sanctions did not arrive until 1940.59 At that time,
President Roosevelt, invoking his executive power under TWEA,
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations to
carry out the purposes of Executive Order 8389, which the
President issued following the invasion of Norway by Nazi
Germany.60 Pursuant to that order, the Secretary established the
Office of Foreign Funds Control (OFFC), OFAC's earliest
predecessor.6 1  The OFFC's initial purpose was to prevent Nazi
use of Norway's holdings of foreign exchange securities and the
forced repatriation of funds belonging to Norwegian nationals. 62
55 Hipp, supra note 48, at 1324 (citing Preston Brown, The Kuwait/Iraq
Sanctions-U.S. Regulations in an International Setting, 562 PRACTISING L. INST. COM.
L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 7, 10 (1990)).
56 See MALLOY, supra note 31, at 150-51 (introducing TWEA with the observation
that modem U.S. sanctions are, "both as a matter of policy and as a matter of technique,
the direct product of their historical antecedents, at least since the immediate pre-World
War II period"); Savage, supra note 48, at 28-29 (explaining that the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the source of almost all current U.S. economic
sanctions, "is the fruit of its predecessor, [TWEA]").
57 See Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (Apr. 10, 1940), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15931 (citing Section 5(b) of TWEA
and delegating regulatory and licensing authority to the Secretary of the Treasury).
58 See An Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports and
Harbors of the United States (Embargo Act), ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (1807) (repealed 1809).
59 See Records of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, NAT'L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/265.html (last visited Jan,
122, 2013) (listing the Foreign Funds Control, established in 1940, as OFAC's earliest
predecessor).
60 See Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (Apr. 10, 1940), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15931.
61 Records of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 59.
62 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 2.
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The OFFC implemented the Foreign Funds Control Regulations
(FFCR), which banned transactions involving the property of
Norway, Denmark, or their nationals, unless licensed by the
Secretary of the Treasury, and froze all Norwegian and Danish
assets held by U.S. persons or their subsidiaries.63 As the war
progressed, Roosevelt expanded the Treasury Department's and
the OFFC's role to protect the assets of other invaded countries, as
well as to provide for the blocking of the assets and financial
transactions of the Axis powers.'
C. Establishment of OFAC and Cold War Anti-Communism
Sanctions
In the years following World War II, the United States found
itself in a position of military and economic strength." With the
subsequent rise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Cold
63 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 94; R. Richard Newcomb, Foreign Assets
Control, 606 PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 329, 537
(1992) ("The FFCR were issued by the Secretary of the Treasury on April 10, 1940, to
implement sanctions imposed by the President through Executive Order 8389 to protect
the property within U.S. jurisdiction of persons in Nazi-occupied territory.").
64 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 94; see also Newcomb, supra note 63 ("[T]he
FFCR were extended through Executive Order 8785 to block property within U.S.
jurisdiction of Germany and its nationals."). The FFCR, which initially froze German,
Japanese, and many other European assets, eventually blocked assets in the Soviet sector
of Germany and in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Lillian V. Blageff,
Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Embargoes Programs, Including 2006 Update, 23 No. 3
CORP. COUNS. QUARTERLY ART. 6 at 10 (2007); R. Richard Newcomb, Office ofForeign
Assets Control, 844 PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
105, 116 (2002). The breakup of the U.S.S.R. negated the policy reasons for these
freezes, and the FFCR were repealed completely by the mid-1990s. Blageff, supra, at
10; Newcomb, supra, at 116. The FFC also implemented the FFCR and administered
the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, more commonly known as the "Black
List." Records of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 59; see also
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 18-19 ("The U.S. Treasury Department ... recognised
that ... a control which could reach only those who were actually citizens of the Axis
countries or of other countries under their domination would be ineffective, and, indeed,
nafve in the light of Axis practices." (internal quotation marks removed)). The Black
List was a precursor to the Specifically Designated Nationals List. See infra text
accompanying notes 233-236.
65 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 126-28. As Dean Acheson, Secretary of
State under President Truman, put it, following World War II, "only the United States
had the power to grab hold of history and make it conform." Benjamin Schwartz, Why
America Thinks It Has to Run the World, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY DIGITAL EDITION,
June 1996, http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/96jun/schwarz/schwarz.htm.
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War, the United States sought to leverage this position to exert
economic pressure to curb the spread of Communism.6 6 It did so
in part through the use of new economic sanctions programs.6 7
One such program was the U.S. sanctioning of North Korea
and China in 1950,6" which necessitated a revitalization of power
within the Treasury Department. 69 The Treasury had abolished the
OFFC in 1947 and transferred its duties to the newly established
Office of International Finance (OIF). 70 In conjunction with this
66 Wolf, supra note 19, at 335-37; see also HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 13
(noting sanctions aimed at regime change in Cuba (1960), the Dominican Republic
(1960), Brazil (1962), and Chile (1970), and characterizing these episodes as "a
superpower pitted against a smaller and formerly friendly country gone 'astray').
67 Id.
68 See Blageff, supra note 64, at 16.
69 Records of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 59 (demonstrating
the creation of OFAC in 1962).
70 Id. For various reasons, principally its sponsoring of terrorism in the 1970s and
1980s and its pursuit through the 1990s and eventual obtainment of nuclear weapons,
economic relations between the United States and North Korea have been "virtually
nonexistent" since the initial imposition of sanctions in 1953. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra
note 13, at 143. North Korea-sponsored terrorism has mostly been directed toward
South Korea. Paul E. Boehm, Decennial Dejta Vu: Reassessing a Nuclear North Korea
on the 1995 Supply Agreement's Ten-Year Anniversary, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 81,
87 (2005). In 1974, a would-be assassin made an attempt on the life of then-South
Korean President Park Chung-Hee. Id. Park survived the assassination attempt, but his
wife was killed by a stray bullet. Id. North Korea denied responsibility until Kim Jong
11 reportedly apologized to Park's daughter in 2002 for the death of her mother. Id. In
October 1983, North Korean agents attempted to assassinate then-South Korean
President Chun Doo-hwan during his trip to Rangoon, Burma. Id. A traffic delay
prevented Chun from arriving at his planned destination on time, but the bomb was
detonated on schedule, killing South Korea's deputy prime minister, foreign minister,
and commerce minister, along with eighteen others. Id. Perhaps North Korea's most
nefarious act of terrorism was the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858, an attack that led
to the United States' designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Id. at
87-88. On November 29, 1987, two North Korean agents, who would later disembark in
Abu Dhabi, planted a bomb in the passenger cabin of Korean Air Flight 858. Id. at 87.
The plane exploded over the Indian Ocean, killing the 115 people on board. Id. Though
the North Korean agents attempted to commit suicide when on the verge of being
captured, one survived, confessed to the bombing, and implicated Kim Jong II, who
allegedly ordered the attack in hopes of destabilizing South Korea before its upcoming
presidential elections and the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul. Id.
In the years following its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, North
Korea continued to draw the ire of the United States through its quest for, and ultimate
obtainment of, nuclear weapons. For a fuller discussion of North Korea's nuclear
ambitions in the 1990s and the U.S. sanctions response, see supra Part II.B.
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structural move, activities relating to blocked foreign assets were
transferred from the OIF to the Office of Alien Property, a division
of the Department of Justice. 7 1 The entry of China into the Korean
War in 1950, however, prompted President Truman to declare a
national emergency under TWEA and to block all Chinese and
North Korean assets under U.S. jurisdiction. 72  To implement
controls over these assets, the Treasury Department created
OFAC.73
For most of its existence, OFAC has been responsible for
overseeing the oldest and most controversial U.S. sanctions
program, the Cuba embargo, which also began as a Cold War-era
effort to stop the spread of Communism and force a regime
change.74 President Eisenhower ordered a partial embargo in 1960
in response to Fidel Castro's ties to the Soviet Union and the
Cuban government's mass expropriation of U.S. property.7 5 In
71 Records ofthe Office ofForeign Assets Control, supra note 59.
72 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 2; see Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99
(1953), available athttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13684.
73 Records of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 59. OFAC was
originally called the Division of Foreign Assets Control, but was renamed by order of the
Treasury Department in 1962. Id.
74 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 146-47 (providing a brief history of the
Cuba sanctions); John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis:
Reconsidering Blocking Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures of
the United States, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 439, 445-49 (1999) (discussing some of the
more controversial components of the Cuba sanctions). North Korea perhaps has the
better claim to the dubious honor of being the "oldest" U.S. sanctions program, although
unlike the Cuba sanctions regulations, the current sanctions against North Korea are not
the same TWEA regulations that the United States imposed in 1950, but rather new
(although in many ways similar) sanctions imposed under IEEPA. See infra note 78.
75 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 146; Boscariol, supra note 74, at 445. For
many decades before the Cuban Revolution in 1959, in keeping with the Monroe
Doctrine, the United States maintained an interest in Cuban affairs and European
influence therein. PAOLO SPADONI, FAILED SANCTIONS: WHY THE U.S. EMBARGO
AGAINST CUBA COULD NEVER WORK 25 (2010). The United States tried several times to
purchase Cuba from Spain and controlled development on the island through military
intervention, trade and investment, and influencing Cuban internal affairs. Id. The
Eisenhower administration recognized Fidel Castro's government in January 1959
following its successful coup against the brutal regime of General Fulgencio Batista. Id.
Though Castro's revolution had gained support through promises to restore civil liberties
and democracy, these promises were never fulfilled and U.S.-Cuba relations quickly
deteriorated. Id.; Daniel Fisk & Courtney R. Perez, Managed Engagement: The Case of
Castro's Cuba, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 47, 53 (2010).
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1962, following the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion, President
Kennedy banned all imports from Cuba, creating a total embargo
on trade with Cuba that in most respects remains in place today.76
This embargo was and remains implemented through OFAC's
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).7 7 The CACR were
imposed under the President's "national emergency" authority
under TWEA; although an amendment to TWEA restricted its
application to wartime emergencies, the CACR were
"grandfathered," and are the only U.S. sanctions presently
maintained under a TWEA national emergency.
D. IEEPA and the Expanding Scope of Sanctions
TWEA remained the statutory basis for U.S. economic
sanctions until the passage of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act 79 (IEEPA) in 1977. IEEPA was the
Yet it was not Castro's poor human rights record or failure to implement a
democratic government that concerned the United States, but rather Castro's planned
economic reforms, which were fueled by Cubans seeking to end decades of U.S.
dominance of the island. SPADONI, supra, at 25. In February 1960, at the height of the
Cold War, Castro entered a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, adding fuel to the
fire. Id. at 25-26. Later in 1960, Castro began to nationalize numerous sectors that
affected United States enterprises, effectively ending private property ownership in
Cuba. Id. at 26. From May 1959 to October 1960, Castro orchestrated a massive
expropriation of U.S. sugar firm property and oil refineries, as well as U.S. property in
the telephone, mining, banking, and electricity sectors. Id at 27. The United States
responded by ending its importation of Cuban sugar and later by banning U.S. exports to
Cuba. Id. The Eisenhower administration severed diplomatic ties with Castro's
government in January 1961. Id. Nevertheless, up until the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Cuba's receipt of subsidies and preferential trade terms from the U.S.S.R.
allowed Cuba to survive without Western capital. Id. at 26.
76 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 146; Boscariol, supra note 74, at 445. As
one journalist put it, "The U.S. and Cuba sure know how to hold a grudge." See Claire
Suddath, A Brief History of U.S.-Cuba Relations, TIME, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html.
77 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2011).
78 Blageff, supra note 64, at 7. The North Korea sanctions were originally
promulgated under the authority of TWEA. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NORTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW OF SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA 2 (2011) [hereinafter OFAC, OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREA
SANCTIONS] (documenting the numerous executive orders and the changes they effected
in the North Korea sanctions program). Although the United States eliminated TWEA-
based North Korean sanctions in 2008, OFAC now implements sanctions against North
Korea under IEEPA. Id.
79 International Emergency Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
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culmination of Congress's response to the numerous extant-yet-
obsolete national emergencies declared under TWEA," such as the
gold emergency in 1933,"' the Korean War,82 the postal strike of
1970, and the 1971 inflation emergency.84 Congress terminated
these bygone "national emergencies" with the National
Emergencies Act (NEA)" and IEEPA." Under IEEPA, the
President's emergency powers remained as expansive as they were
under TWEA before NEA restored the original wartime
limitation." IEEPA attempted to improve Congress's oversight
over the President's exercise of his emergency powers, however,
by imposing certain conditions on those powers, including
requirements that "(1) the President declare a peacetime national
emergency; (2) make certain findings; and (3) notify the Congress
of these findings."" Upon the President's declaration of a national
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707).
80 See S. REP. No. 93-549, at 4-6 (1973) (describing various declarations of
national emergencies that had not been "terminat[ed] .. . when the particular emergency
itself ha[d], in fact, ended").
81 See Exec. Order No. 6260 (Aug. 28, 1933) (amended by Exec. Order No.
10,896 (Nov. 29, 1960), 25 Fed. Reg. 12,281 (1960), Exec. Order No. 10,905 (Jan. 20,
1962), 26 Fed. Reg. 321 (1961), Exec. Order No. 11,037 (July 20, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg.
6967 (1962), and revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,825 (Dec. 31, 1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 1003
(1974)).
82 See Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Dec. 16, 1950).
83 See Exec. Order No. 11,519, 3 C.F.R. 111 (1971).
84 See Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (Aug 1, 1971).
85 See National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2006) ("All powers
and authorities possessed by the President. . . as a result of the existence of any
declaration of national emergency in effect on [the date of enactment of this Act] are
terminated. . . .").
86 The International Economic Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707
(2006).
87 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 95; see generally Note, The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential
Emergency Power, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1102, 1106-19 (1983) [hereinafter Note,
Congressional Control] (describing the substantive, definitional, and procedural
limitations placed on TWEA in 1977, but noting that IEEPA is "basically parallel" to the
prior statute).
88 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 95; see also Note, Congressional Control, supra
note 87, at 1116-19 (describing the procedural limitations of IEEPA). The President
must consult with Congress before exercising any of his powers under IEEPA and must
regularly report to Congress on the status of the actions taken. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a)-(c).
Additionally, because NEA governs the President's power to declare a national
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emergency, IEEPA grants the chief executive broad economic
regulatory powers "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States."" Such powers include the authority to
block a wide array of foreign transactionso and, in times of war,
the authority to confiscate certain foreign-owned property.9'
Although TWEA remains in place and is the statutory basis for
U.S. sanctions against Cuba,9 2 IEEPA governs every other current
OFAC sanctions program. 93 Since 1976, there have been thirty-
two declared national emergencies, the last of which came after
the terrorist attacks of September 1 Ith and remains in effect
today. 94
During the Cold War era, IEEPA provided the basis for
broadening the United States' application of economic sanctions. 95
emergency under IEEPA, the President's declaration is subject to termination review by
Congress every six months, and a declared emergency terminates on its anniversary
unless renewed by the President. Id § 1622.
89 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
90 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (granting the President the power to block "any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation
or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States").
91 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C).
92 OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASUREY, CUBA: WHAT
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA (2012).
93 International Law Advisory - OFAC Issues Interim Policy on Civil Penalties
Under IEEPA Enhancement Act, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-5012.html.
94 HAROLD C. RELYEA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: NATIONAL EMERGENCY
POWERS 13 (2001), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6216.pdf;
see Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sep. 14, 2001). In September 2011,
President Obama announced his decision to continue "the national emergency with
respect to the terrorist threat." Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Message from the President Regarding the Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/09/message-president-regarding-
continuation-national-emergency-respect-cert.
95 See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 95 (explaining that Congress passed IEEPA
because it felt that the president did not have the means of "restrict[ing] private
international financial transactions as part of an overall economic sanctions policy in
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Although stopping the spread of Communism remained an
important U.S. foreign policy objective, the United States began to
see economic sanctions as a solution to other emerging foreign
policy issues as well.96 One of these issues was the rise of state-
sponsored terrorism.97 Airplane hijackings in the 1960s and
1970s,98 the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich
Olympics," and the Lockerbie Bombing in 1988' "focused [the]
times of undeclared war").
96 See generally id at 90 (explaining that the United States has increasingly
employed sanctions to force certain countries to follow international law since the end of
the Cold War).
97 Id. at 89.
98 Before the late 1960s, U.S. airplane hijackings were rare. See Ric Simmons,
Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843,
851 (2010) ("In the decade preceding 1968, hijackings had averaged only one per
year."). Terrorists hijacked eighteen planes in 1968, however, and thirty-three in 1969.
Id. The number of hijackings remained high-in the mid-twenties-through 1972. Id.
n.1 1. The U.S. government responded by implementing surveillance programs and
passenger screening at airports. Id. at 851-52. The federal courts upheld the
constitutionality of these measures, giving rise to the administrative search exception to
the Fourth Amendment. See id at 855-59 (discussing how the federal courts justified
curtailing Fourth Amendment protections on account of hijacking and domestic bombing
epidemics in the late 1960s and early 1970s). After a few anomalous years in the late
1970s and early 1980s, U.S. hijackings were almost nonexistent in the late 1980s and
disappeared entirely through the 1990s. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION 67 (2001), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa8.pdf. The September 11th
hijackings were the first U.S. hijackings in nine years. Id.
99 For the definitive account of the massacre and aftermath, see generally SIMON
REEVE, ONE DAY IN SEPTEMBER: THE FULL STORY OF THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS
MASSACRE AND THE ISRAELI REVENGE OPERATION "WRATH OF GOD" 1-19 (Arcade
Publishing 2000). At the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, the Palestinian group
Black September took members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage. Id. During the
kidnapping and failed rescue attempt, eleven Israeli athletes and coaches, five members
of Black September, and one West German police officer were killed. Id. at 124, 132.
Israel initially responded by bombing Palestine Liberation Organization bases in Syria
and Lebanon. Id. at 152-53. Among the dead were an estimated two hundred innocent
people, including many women and children. Id. Later, hijackers of a West German
passenger jet demanded and obtained the release of the surviving Black September
gunmen. Id at 155-159. Israel then authorized the Mossad to track down and eliminate
those responsible for the massacre in Munich. Id. at 159-74.
100 On December 22, 1988, a bomb detonated in the cargo hold of Pan Am Flight
103, killing the 259 people on board, including 189 Americans. War Crimes Research
Symposium, A Thorn on the Tulip - A Scottish Trial in the Netherlands: The Story
Behind the Lockerbie Trial, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 307, 308 (2005). The flight was
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world's attention on terrorism."' 1 In 1979, the State Department
designated Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen as state sponsors
of terrorism; this subsequently led to the imposition of sanctions
against Libya and Iraq for supplying military equipment to
102terrorists.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the United States made
additional use of sanctions in areas such as the protection of
human rights'o3 and nonproliferation.104 Most of the human rights
initiatives occurred in the late 1970s and were unilateral'os U.S.
sanctions aimed at affecting regime change in Latin America. 0 6
In 1977, for instance, the United States signaled its opposition to
the Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua by
withdrawing economic and military assistance. 0 7 With respect to
bound from London to New York and exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. Id. Bodies
and debris from the plane fell on and around the small town of Lockerbie, killing eleven
people on the ground. Id. After nearly three years of investigations, including thousands
of interviews and the review of tens of thousands of pieces of evidence and photographs,
the United Kingdom and the United States concluded that two Libyan security agents
who had worked for Libyan Airlines in Malta perpetrated the bombing. Id
101 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 15; see also Matthew Lippman, The New
Terrorism and International Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 297, 325-36 (discussing
international responses to terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s).
102 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 15-16. Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and
Afghanistan were later added to this list; Iraq was removed in 2003 after the U.S.
invasion, and Libya was removed in 2006 for implicitly admitting its responsibility for
the Lockerbie bombing and for compensating the victims' families. Id. at 16.
103 Id at 13.
104 Id. at 53.
105 This Article adopts the definition of "unilateral" sanctions used by the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (the TSRA), 22 U.S.C. § 7201-7211
(2006). The TSRA defines unilateral sanctions as those imposed in the absence of (1)
substantially equivalent measures imposed by fellow members of a multi-country
initiative or (2) a U.N. Security Council mandate. See id. § 7201(6)-(7) (defining
unilateral sanctions within the context of agriculture and medicine).
106 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 13. Of the 17 sanctions initiatives imposed
by the United States during the Carter administration, 10 targeted Latin American
countries, 8 sought improvements to human rights, and all were unilateral. See id. at 23-
26 (listing sanctions programs from 1962 to 1986).
107 Id. at 13. The withdrawal of U.S. support assisted the rise of the Fidel Castro-
funded Sandinista National Liberation Front, a leftist group that ousted the Somoza
dictatorship from power in 1979. Id; see also Hunter R. Clark & Amanda Velazquez,
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: Nicaragua-A Case Study, 16 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 743, 781-94 (2001) (surveying the U.S. relationship with Nicaragua during the
Cold War, the Somoza dictatorship, and the reign of the Sandinista regime). In other
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nonproliferation, the United States opposed the development of
weapons of mass destruction in South Africa, Taiwan, Brazil, and
Argentina.'o Furthermore, it partnered with Canada in 1975 to
prevent South Korea from purchasing a nuclear reprocessing plant,
and again in the late 1970s to impose sanctions against India and
Pakistan.'" Though varied in success,"0 these early ventures were
the first attempts at the broader use of sanctions, a pattern that
would define the post-Cold War period."'
III.Modern U.S. Sanctions Policy
The years following the collapse of the Soviet Union can be
described as the beginning of the era of modern U.S. sanctions
policy. Particularly over the last decade, the United States has
increasingly used both its position as the global financial hub, and
foreign firms' and financial markets' reliance on the U.S. dollar as
a reserve currency, to impose restrictive measures against state and
non-state targets." 2 During this period, the U.S. sanctions regime
has developed Cold War-carryover measures," 3 pursued several of
the sanctions objectives arising towards the end of the Cold
War,1 4 and targeted new areas like narcotics trafficking,"'
Latin American countries, U.S. sanctions experienced less success. See HUFBAUER ET
AL., supra note 13, at 13 ("U.S. sanctions against the Alfredo Stroessner regime in
Paraguay . .. and the military regimes in Argentina . .. and El Salvador failed to change
the behavior of these regimes.").
10 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 12; William C. Potter, The Second Last
Chance: American Power and Nuclear Nonproliferation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 2,
2005, at B16.
109 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 12.
110 See id. at 12 (finding that while nonproliferation sanctions were "highly
successful" in South Korea and Taiwan, they "played only a limited role in dissuading
South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina from becoming nuclear powers" and failed with
respect to India and Pakistan, as evidenced by those countries' 1998 nuclear tests).
1I1 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 90.
112 See id at 36-40, 50 (discussing how states use their comparative advantages in
certain industries to implement more effective sanctions regimes, as exemplified by the
United States' leveraging of its financial industry against its adversaries).
113 See infra Part III.A (discussing Cuba sanctions); infra notes 140-152 (discussing
nonproliferation sanctions against North Korea).
114 See infra Part III.C (discussing counterterrorism sanctions); infra Part III.D
(discussing sanctions aimed at improving human rights and forcing regime change).
115 U.S. counter narcotics sanctions, the only ones of their kind, began in the 1980s
with the initiation of a certification process that triggers economic sanctions against a
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international crime,"' and terrorism. 117 These initiatives, through
which the OFAC's role has expanded tremendously since its
creation over fifty years ago,"' exemplify U.S. sanctions programs
country identified as a major drug producer unless that country demonstrates its
cooperation in U.S. antidrug efforts or the U.S. president waives the sanctions for
national security reasons. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 15. Nevertheless, most
countries were certified through the 1980s, with sanctions typically being leveled against
countries with few geographic or economic ties to the United States, such as Iran, Syria,
and Afghanistan. Id. The Clinton administration changed this in the 1990s, decertifying
Nigeria in 1994 and threatening Mexico and Colombia with the same fate. Id. In 1996,
the United States certified Mexico but denied certification to Colombia due to
Colombian president Ernesto Samper's alleged ties to drug cartels. Id. These decisions
led to accusations from Latin American leaders of a double standard. Id. The
accusations grew louder in 1997, when the Clinton administration again certified Mexico
and denied certification to Colombia, despite revelations of drug-related corruption in the
Mexican government. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 15. After "years of relative
quiet," the Bush administration decertified Venezuela in 2005 as U.S.-Venezuela
relations deteriorated, prompting criticism that the President had used the certification
process for political purposes. Id.
116 Issued by President Obama on July 24, 2011, Executive Order 13,581 found that
"the activities of significant transnational criminal organizations ["TCOs"] . . . have
reached such scope and gravity that they threaten the stability of international political
and economic systems" and that "[s]uch organizations are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and dangerous to the United States .. . [and] are increasingly entrenched in
the operations of foreign governments and the international financial system, thereby
weakening democratic institutions, degrading the rule of law, and undermining economic
markets." Exec. Order No. 13,581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,757, 44,757 (July 24, 2011).
Executive Order 13,581 further found that "[t]hese organizations facilitate and aggravate
violent civil conflicts and increasingly facilitate the activities of other dangerous
persons." Id. The order designates four organizations as TCOs; authorizes the Treasury
Secretary to designate additional TCOs, their supporters, and their affiliates; and imposes
an asset freeze and transactions ban on those persons. Id. at 44,757-58. U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder indicated that the ability to designate TCOs allows U.S. regulators
to "extend the reach of anti-money-laundering provisions and update racketeering laws
to cover new forms of crime." Palmina M. Fava, Strategies for Staying in Compliance
with the FCPA and Other International Anti-Corruption Laws, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE
COLLAR ENFORCEMENT: LEADING LAWYERS ON COOPERATING WITH ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, UNDERSTANDING NEW LAWS, AND CONSTRUCTING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
23, 39 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2012). "Attorney General Holder added that these changes
would enhance the DOJ's ability to prosecute securities fraud and violations of the
FCPA." Id.
117 See infra Part III.C.
118 See Tracy J. Chin, Note, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How OFAC'S Regulations
Restrain First Amendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1883, 1887-88 (2008) (explaining
how the OFAC has grown over time and describing in brief the sanctions programs it
administers).
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as they exist today: diversified in purpose, varied in scope, and
increasingly flexible." 9
A. New Tricks for Old Dogs in Cuba
U.S. sanctions policy from the 1990s onward has experienced
a gradual move toward multilateralism and cooperation with
international sanctioning bodies such as the U.N. and EU.'20
119 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 133 ("The US president enjoys broad
authority under several statutes to impose sanctions in response to national security or
foreign policy concerns. [These statutes] enable the president to prohibit some or all
trade and financial transactions with foreign countries, groups or individuals.").
120 See id at 130 (noting that U.S. sanctions in the 1990s "entailed more
cooperation," which led to higher success rates); Kimberly Ann Elliott, Trends in
Economic Sanctions Policy, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS
IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 3, 4 (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005) ("Nearly
60 new instances of sanctions were recorded in the 1990s and, of these, 42 involved the
United States, usually in cooperation with other countries.... [T]he United States was
less a Lone Ranger in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s."); Gary Clyde Hufbauer &
Barbara Oegg, The European Union as an Emerging Sender of Economic Sanctions, 58
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 547, 551 (2003) [hereinafter Hufbauer & Oegg, EU As a Sender of
Sanctions] ("Less than a third of the [U.S.] cases initiated in the 1990s were purely
unilateral ventures. By contrast, in the 1970s, the United States was involved in 32
sanction episodes and three-quarters of them were unilateral initiatives."); see also
Samuel Rubenfeld, Clinton Names Iran Sanctions Waiver Recipients, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
20, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/03/20/clinton-names-iran-
sanctions-waiver-recipients [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Clinton Names Waiver Recipients]
("Clinton cited the European Union embargo [against Iran] . . . as 'solidarity' with the
United States and 'their commitment to holding Iran accountable for its failure to comply
with international obligations."').
Many commentators attribute the United States' shift toward multilateralism to
the United States' decreased hegemony in the world economy. See HUFBAUER ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 128 (pointing to "the relative decline of the US position in the world
economy" as the "most obvious and important explanation" and explaining that
"economic progress worldwide has reduced the pool of truly vulnerable target
countries"); Developments in the Law-Responding to Extraterritorial Legislation: The
European Union and Secondary Sanctions, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1246, 1255 (2011)
[hereinafter EU and Secondary Sanctions] (noting that the emergence of the EU common
market, "in rivaling that of the United States, has leveled the playing field between U.S.
and EU regulators"). Additional explanations include enhanced cooperation between the
major world powers following the collapse of the U.S.S.R., see Hufbauer & Oegg, EU
As a Sender of Sanctions, supra, at 551 (noting the increased presence of the United
Nations in international disputes following the collapse of the Soviet Union as reflected
by the United Nations imposition of mandatory sanctions thirteen times in the 1990s as
compared to just two instances of sanctions in previous decades), and a shift in
geographical focus from Latin America to Africa and the Middle East-regions with
historically closer ties to Europe, see id at 552 (noting the decline in sanctions targeting
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Despite this shift, the Cuba sanctions have remained a bastion of
unilateralism and extraterritoriality, generating plenty of
international controversy and even several "blocking laws."' 2'
Following the downfall of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, Fidel Castro's
regime was expected to follow, as it had relied on the U.S.S.R. as
a trade partner after the United States imposed its embargo.12 2 The
Castro regime survived, but the United States would not pass up
an opportunity to "squeeze one of the last communist States in the
world." 23 The result was the passage of the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 (CDA),12 4 which tightened the already smothering
economic sanctions against the island nation.125  OFAC
implemented these new sanctions with amendments to the
CACR.126  Although the new regulations imposed numerous
additional restrictions, the most controversial aspect of the CDA
was its imposition of U.S. sanctions against foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations doing business with Cuba or Cuban nationals.127
Latin American countries during the 1990s as the region "moved towards democratic
governance" and the increase in sanctions initiatives in Africa due to the rise of
oppressive regimes, and arguing that "[this shift in geographical focus-from the U.S.
backyard to a region with historically closer ties to Europe-is one factor in the decline
in unilateral U.S. sanctions and the rise of European initiatives"). It may also be that the
United States has simply found, through its experience with the Iraq, counterterrorism,
and weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") nonproliferation sanctions, that multilateral
sanctions are more effective and worth building consensus around through the United
Nations and European Union. Werner Interview, supra note 24.
121 See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text; infra notes 317-24 and
accompanying text.
122 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 146.
123 Cedric Ryngaert, Extraterritorial Export Controls (Secondary Boycotts), 7
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 625, 636 (2008); see also HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 146.
124 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (2006). The CDA came
in the wake of the failure of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 636; see also 22 U.S.C. § 6001(6) ("The fall of
Communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal
recognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of
government and development, and the evident inability of Cuba's economy to survive
current trends, provide the United States and the international democratic community
with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in
Cuba.").
125 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 146; Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 636.
126 For a summary of the various amendments in the early 1990s to the CACR, see
Blageff, supra note 64, at 6-8.
127 See Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(d) (2011) (including
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This extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions provoked
international backlash,'28 which was only exacerbated by
Congress's enactment of the Helms-Burton Act (Helms-Burton).'2 9
Helms-Burton, among other things, prohibits any person, foreign
or domestic, from "trafficking" in American property that the
Cuban government confiscated following the Cuban Revolution.13 0
The CDA and Helms-Burton provoked "blocking laws" or "anti-
boycott laws" from several countries.' 3 ' These "blocking laws"
generally prohibit persons under the jurisdiction of the enacting
countries from complying with U.S. sanctions against Cuba.'32
Although some of these laws have not given rise to conflicts,' 3
"[a]ny corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or
doing business, that is owned or controlled by [a U.S. national]" in the definition of
"person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"); Blageff, supra note 64, at 6
(explaining that the CACR used to allow the export of bunker fuel, provisions, and
supplies under an EAR general license to Cuban vessels or vessels carrying Cuban goods
or individuals, and that this was disallowed by the 1992 Act).
128 See Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions Laws
with Obligations Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 STETSON L. REV.
1259, 1266 (1998).
129 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (Helms-Burton Act) of
1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (2006).
130 Helms-Burton provides the U.S. national who possesses the claim to such
property with a civil cause of action against the alleged trafficker. 22 U.S.C. § 6082.
The creation of this private right of action caused considerable controversy. See Blageff,
supra note 64, at 8 ("Several of the U.S. major trading partners considered enacting
retaliatory legislation or bringing charges before a World Trade Organization or North
American Free Trade Agreement panel."); Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 645-48
(discussing the negative international reaction to Helms-Burton, in particular Europe).
In response to this controversy, U.S. presidents have exercised their authority
continuously since 1996 to suspend the private right of action for renewable six-month
periods. Blageff, supra note 64, at 8; Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 638-39; see also Tim
Bearden, Helms-Burton Act: Resurrecting the Iron Curtain, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC
AFFAIRS (June 10, 2011) http://www.coha.org/helms-burton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-
curtain (discussing the reaction to Helms-Burton and the negotiations that led to repeated
waivers of the private right of action).
131 See infra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
132 Id. The Canadian Parliament even introduced a bill that mocked Helms-Burton
by proclaiming the right of Canadian descendants of Loyalists who fled the American
Revolution to reclaim land and property confiscated by the American government. See
Bill C-339: The American Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Loyalty) Act 1996 (Can.),
available at http://web.textfiles.com/politics/NWO/nwo_0012.txt; Ryngaert, supra note
123, at 647 (discussing the bill).
133 See Blageff, supra note 64, at 8 (explaining that Helms-Burton's controversial
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several companies have been caught in situations where
compliance with OFAC's regulations meant violating Canada's
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA), and vice versa.134
In addition to expanding the CACR's jurisdictional reach,
Helms-Burton took the unusual step of removing much of the
President's discretion with respect to the Cuba embargo.'35
Section 102(h) of Helms-Burton codified as federal statutory law
"[t]he economic embargo of Cuba, as in effect on March 1, 1996,
including all restrictions under [the CACR]."l3 6 This provision
effectively removed the President's authority to reduce sanctions
against Cuba; the act provides for the removal of the Cuba
embargo only upon a determination, based on an array of
enumerated factors, that a "transitional" democratic government is
in power.'3 ' Despite the fact that many politicians and
commentators have either called for the end of the Cuba embargo
private right of action has been waived to avoid conflicts with U.S. trading partners);
Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 646-48 (discussing EU Council Regulation 2271/96 and
noting that the regulation "is mainly of symbolic relevance, as no relevant cases have
arisen").
134 See infra note 325 (discussing an historical example of such a conflict). The
Hotel Sheraton Maria Isabel, located in Mexico City, was the locus of such a conflict in
February 2006, when OFAC demanded the eviction of a group of Cuban officials who
were meeting there with representatives from American oil companies to discuss
investment opportunities. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexico and Cuba Protest Hotel's
Expulsion of Havana Delegation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/02/07/international/americas/07mexico.html. OFAC telephoned the hotel's U.S.
parent company to inform it that it was violating the Cuba embargo by allowing the
meeting to take place. Id. The Sheraton told the Cuban officials to leave and sent their
room deposits to the Treasury Department. Id. The Mexican government later fined the
hotel for violating Mexican commerce laws. See Sheraton Hotel Finedfor Expelling
Cubans, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2006) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-03-
26/news/0603260401 1 starwood-hotels-resorts-sheraton-maria-isabel-hotel-mexican-
government.
135 See Blageff, supra note 64, at 8 (describing the limitations Helms-Burton places
on presidential authority to modify the Cuba embargo); Amy Dean Westbrook, What's
In Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of
Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 1151, 1178 n.173 (2010).
136 Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6032.
137 See id §§ 204-06 (requiring such a determination and listing factors like the
legalization of all political activity, the release of all political prisoners, a showing of
basic respect for the civil liberties and human rights of Cuban citizens, and free and fair
elections).
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or at least significant pullbacks from the embargo,138 these
limitations on the President's authority mean that real change is
unlikely-and unlawful-without congressional action.139
B. Nonproliferation from North Korea to Iran
The United States' North Korea sanctions program, another
relic of the Cold War, still features prominently.'40 As discussed
in Part C above, the original sanctions were imposed in connection
with the Korean War,' 4 ' and were later imposed in the 1980s in
response to North Korea's support of terrorism.'4 2 Since the
1990s, however, the focus has shifted to North Korea's pursuit of
nuclear weapons. 4 3 North Korean sanctions vaulted to the fore in
March 1993, when North Korea announced its intent to
"withdraw[] from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
over a dispute about inspections of its nuclear waste sites." 44
After heated negotiations, the United States, South Korea, Japan,
and North Korea came to an agreement in 1994.14 Under the so-
called "Agreed Framework," North Korea pledged to abolish its
nuclear program in exchange for two light-water reactors and the
easing of U.S. sanctions.'4 6 Though by no means harmonious, the
U.S.-North Korea relationship was comparably less hostile
through the late 1990s, with the United States easing sanctions and
138 E.g., The Associated Press, 50 Years After Kennedy's Ban, Embargo on Cuba
Remains, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/a
mericas/american-embargo-on-cuba-has-50th-anniversary.html?_r-O.
139 Christine L. Quickenden, Note and Comment, Helms-Burton and Canadian-
American Relations at the Crossroads: The Need for An Effective, Bilateral Cuban
Policy, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 733, 747 (1997).
140 See HUFBAUER FT AL., supra note 13, at 143-44 (explaining the present state of
the U.S. sanctions program toward North Korea).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
142 See supra note 70 (citing several acts of terrorism that gave rise to the United
States' designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism).
143 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 21, 31 (showing the United States'
sanction goals vis-A-vis North Korea).
144 Id., at 143; Eunice Lee, Operation 'Denucleunification': A Proposal for the
Reunification and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 33 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 245, 252-53 (2010).
145 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 143; Lee, supra note 144, at 256-57.
146 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 143; Lee, supra note 144, at 256-57.
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North Korea dismantling its nuclear program.147 In 2000, "Clinton
administration officials announced a plan to lift a broad range of
North Korea sanctions" and allow imports from, travel to, and
investment in North Korea.'48
However, this progress quickly evaporated in the early years of
the Bush administration. 14 9  Both the United States and North
Korea accused the other of breaching the Agreed Framework; as a
result, the United States and its allies halted construction of North
Korea's two light-water reactors and North Korea withdrew from
the NPT and resumed its nuclear program.150  Despite several
attempts at negotiating an accord, the United States and North
Korea maintained icy relations during the mid-2000s, with North
Korea's 2006 nuclear weapons test playing no small part.'
Comprehensive economic sanctions against North Korea remain in
place today.152
Amid all of the developments in the North Korea sanctions
program during the 1990s, the Clinton administration issued two
executive orders that signaled a shift in the way the U.S. sanctions
regime addressed WMD proliferation.153  In November 1994,
President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,938 (EO 12,938),154
declaring WMD proliferation a national emergency.'5 ' EO 12,938
147 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 143. But see Lee, supra note 144, at 257-58
(describing North Korea's frustrations with the United States' perceived failure to meet
its obligations under the Agreed Framework).
148 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 143; DIANNE E. RENNACK, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, NORTH KOREA: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 10 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf.
149 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 143.
150 Id. at 143; Lee, supra note 144, at 258-59.
151 For a more complete summary of this period in U.S.-North Korea relations, see
Lee, supra note 144, at 257-62.
152 See Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 31 C.F.R. pt. 510 (2011); see generally
OFAC, OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS, supra note 78 (summarizing OFAC's
current North Korea sanctions, including an asset freeze and general ban on imports).
153 Exec. Order No. 12,938, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,099 (Nov. 16, 1994); Exec. Order No.
13,094, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,803 (July 28, 1998).
154 Exec. Order No. 12,938, 59 Fed. Reg. at 59,099.
155 See id. ("I ... find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons ('weapons of mass destruction') and of the means of delivering such weapons,
constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with
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tightened export controls by directing the Secretaries of State and
Commerce to "control any exports . .. that either Secretary
determine[d] would assist a country in acquiring the capability to
develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass
destruction or their means of delivery."'l 6  Additionally, EO
12,938 provided for limited sanctions against any person or
country that the Secretary of State determined had knowingly
contributed to the efforts of any foreign country or entity to "use,
develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical or
biological weapons.""s' In 1998, President Clinton strengthened
and amended EO 12,938 with Executive Order 13,094,'8 which
facilitated the State Department's designation process by
removing the "knowing" requirement; adding "attempted
contributions" to the listed offenses; and adding nuclear weapons,
radiological weapons, and missiles capable of delivering WMD to
the ban on chemical and biological weapons.'
U.S. use of targeted sanctions against WMD Proliferators
amplified in the years after the September 1lt attacks.'6 0
Following the invasion of Iraq-which had been targeted with
nonproliferation measures-and the United States' failure to
discover WMD there, President Bush issued Executive Order
13,328,161 establishing a commission to assess whether the U.S.
intelligence community was capable of effectively identifying and
warning the U.S. government of acts of WMD proliferation.16 2
that threat.").
156 Id. § 2.
157 Id. §§ 4, 5. With respect to sanctioned "foreign persons," EO 12,938 imposed
an import ban and prohibited U.S. government departments and agencies from
contracting with such persons. See id § 4(b). With respect to sanctioned "foreign
countries," the measures were harsher-including a prohibition on foreign assistance,
U.S. opposition to any multilateral development bank assistance, a general prohibition on
exports and imports, and the termination of landing rights-although asset freezes and
transaction bans were not available to U.S. regulators until Executive Order 13,382. See
infra text accompanying notes 161-162.
158 Exec. Order No. 13,094, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,803.
159 CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The US. Campaign to
Freeze Assets of Prolhferators and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 849, 853 (2009);
see Exec. Order No. 13,094, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,803-04.
160 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 142.
161 Exec. Order No. 13,328, 69 Fed. Reg. 6,901 (Feb. 6, 2004).
162 Id. at 6,901-03.
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The commission recommended that the President use the same
restrictive measures, namely asset freezes, that were in place to
fight terrorism under Executive Order 13,224163 and advised the
President that the "intersection of terrorism and proliferation posed
the greatest threat to the United States."'" In response to the
commission's recommendations, President Bush issued Executive
Order 13,382 (EO 13,382).165 EO 13,382 bolstered U.S. non-
proliferation sanctions by providing four categories of designated
proliferators: (1) persons designated in EO 13,382 itself; (2)
persons the State Department determined to be engaged in
proliferation; (3) persons the Treasury Department determined to
have provided support for proliferation; and (4) persons the
Treasury Department determined to be owned or controlled by, or
acting or purporting to act on behalf of, other designated
persons.166  President Bush also ordered an asset freeze and
transaction ban on all persons designated under EO 13,382.167
Although not strictly based on non-proliferation objectives, 68
U.S. sanctions against Iran recently intensified under the directive
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
163 See infra text accompanying notes 192-193.
164 Guymon, supra note 159, at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 531 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd-report.pdf; see also Weapons ofMass Destruction:
Stopping the Funding-The OFAC Role: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of
Robert W. Werner, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury) ("In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the horrifying prospect
of WMD falling into the hands of terrorist or rogue regimes has become all the more real
to us."), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg28101/html/CHRG-
109hhrg28101.htm.
165 Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (June 28, 2005).
166 See id § 1(a); Guymon, supra note 159, at 854 (discussing these categories and
providing a general overview of the State and Treasury Departments' designation
practices under EO 13,382).
167 See Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. at 38,567-69.
168 The new Iran sanctions, although largely a response to Iran's refusal to drop its
nuclear ambitions, also require the identification and designation of Iranian government
officials responsible for or complicit in human rights violations in the fallout of the June
2009 Iranian elections. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), 22 U.S.C. § 8514 (2010).
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Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA),1 69  which amended the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA)170  to reflect the United States'
increasing concern with Iran's developing nuclear program. 7 1
CISADA's most significant amendments affect Iran's energy and
financial services industries.17 2 Although the ISA already imposed
sanctions against companies investing over specified limits in
Iran's energy sector, CISADA expanded the list of transactions
subject to sanctions, in particular the import of gasoline and other
refined petroleum products.173 CISADA also broadened the scope
of the entities to which those measures apply.174  The ISA
sanctions applied to both U.S. and non-U.S. companies and
allowed for sanctions against a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate
of a sanctioned person only if that affiliate knowingly engaged in
sanctioned activities. Whereas, CISADA extended liability to
affiliates that own or control sanctioned persons and knew or
should have known that "the sanctioned person was engaging in
prohibited activities.""' CISADA also added three new penalties
to the menu available to the executive branch in the event that a
169 CISADA, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
80a-13 note, scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
170 Iran Sanctions Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2010).
171 EU and Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1250. For a summary of the
EU's recent Iran sanctions, see Edward L. Rubinoff & Shiva Aminian, Recent U.S. and
Multilateral Sanctions Against Iran: A New Framework?, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT
CONTROLs 231-32 (2010). CISADA expanded on what is known as a "secondary
boycott." Secondary boycotts prohibit third-country exporters from exporting to a
country already sanctioned under a "primary" boycott. Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 626.
Secondary boycotts are often controversial in that they "universalize a primary boycott"
by "interven[ing] in the commercial relations between actors who are not active within.
the territory of the regulating State." Id. Notably, due to multilateral opposition to Iran's
ongoing nuclear program, CISADA has not been subject to the level of criticism seen
with previous instances of U.S. secondary boycotts. Rubinoff& Aminian at 231-32 .
172 See EU and Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1250; Rubinoff &
Aminian, supra note 171, at 211.
173 See EU and Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1250-51 (detailing the
newly targeted activities); Rubinoff & Aminian, supra note 171, at 215-16 (detailing the
same).
174 Rubinoff & Aminian, supra note 171, at 216-17.
175 See Harry L. Clark & Jonathan W. Ware, Limits on International Business in the
Petroleum Sector: CFIUS Investment Screening, Economic Sanctions, Anti-Bribery
Rules, and Other Measures, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 75, 102 (2011); Rubinoff &
Aminian, supra note 171, at 216-17.
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violation is found: a foreign exchange transactions ban, a ban on
the transfer of credit or payments through financial institutions
that involve the sanctioned person's interests, and a ban on
transactions involving property in which the sanctioned person has
an interest. 7 6  While the State Department is responsible for
identifying persons acting in violation of these sanctions, the
OFAC is responsible for implementing CISADA's substantial
penalties.'77
CISADA's second major addition to the ISA focused on the
activities of U.S. and foreign financial institutions.' CISADA
requires the Treasury Department to implement regulations
restricting U.S. correspondent accounts of foreign financial
institutions that commit certain sanctionable activities, including:
facilitating the Iranian government's efforts to acquire or develop
WMD or to support international terrorism; facilitating the
activities of persons subject to financial sanctions under certain
U.N. resolutions; carrying out such activities through money
laundering or facilitating efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or
other Iranian financial institution; and transacting with or
providing significant financial services to the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps.'7 9 Per CISADA's directive, the
OFAC has promulgated regulations implementing the statute."s
CISADA's broad measures and tough penalties have been a
cause for concern among countries that import significant amounts
of oil from Iran yet cannot afford to be shut out of the U.S.
financial system, as the new sanctions would effectively
mandate.'' Under the previous version of the ISA, the President
176 See Clark & Ware, supra note 175, at 101 (listing the penalties available,
including those under the ISA, totaling eight; under CISADA, the President must impose
at least three of the penalties where a violation has occurred); Rubinoff & Aminian,
supra note 171, at 215-17 (listing the same).
177 Jasper Helder, Focus on Iran (June 2011), 943 PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. &
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 399, 402 (2011); see also Exec. Order No. 13,574, 76
Fed. Reg. 30,505, 30,505-07 (May 23, 2011).
178 See EU and Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1250-51; Rubinoff &
Aminian, supra note 171, at 220-24.
179 See EU and Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1251 n.46 (detailing the
financial restrictions imposed by CISADA); Rubinoff & Aminian, supra note 171, at 222
(detailing the same).
180 See 31 C.F.R. pt. 561 (2011).
181 See, e.g., Sheila A. Smith, Japan's Iran Sanctions Dilemma, COUNCIL ON
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had the authority to grant a penalty waiver to an entity deemed to
have engaged in prohibited activities if he certified to Congress
that the waiver was "important to the national interest." 82 Though
CISADA left in place the President's waiver power, the statute
tightened the certification standard to "necessary to the national
interest."' The President may also grant a six-month waiver of
the energy-related sanctions upon certification to Congress that the
waiver is "vital to the national security interests of the United
States."'8 4
FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/01/31 /japan%E2%80%99s-
iran-sanctions-dilemma (discussing the challenges Japan faces as a large importer of
Iranian oil and efforts it has made to comply with the new U.S. sanctions); ALEXANDER,
supra note 31, at 46-47 ("Japan's high level of economic and financial interaction with
the United States and dependence on cross border lending in U.S. dollars has subjected it
to tremendous U.S. economic and political influence, especially regarding the
application of U.S. sanctions.").
182 See Rubinoff & Aminian, supra note 171, at 219-220 (explaining CISADA's
changes to the waiver provision); see also Clark & Ware, supra note 175, at 102-03
(discussing presidential discretion under CISADA).
183 See Clark & Ware, supra note 175, at 102-03; see also Rubinoff & Aminian,
supra note 171, at 219-220. While "necessary" denotes a stricter test than "important," it
remains to be seen whether this change will manifest in practice. Waivers granted thus
far have dealt with the energy-related sanctions, for which CISADA requires the waiver
to be "vital," rather than "necessary." See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
184 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA), 22 U.S.C. § 8501 note (2010); see also Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (May 23,
2011), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/esc/iransanctions/docs/160710.htm. The President may
grant a twelve-month waiver if he certifies to Congress that, in addition to being "vital to
the national security interests of the United States," the waiver exempts a person subject
to the primary jurisdiction of a "government ... [that] is closely cooperating with the
United States in multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from . . . acquiring or developing
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or ... acquiring or
developing destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional
weapons ... CISADA." Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (CISADA), 50 U.S.C. 1701 note (2010). In March 2012, the United States
granted CISADA waivers to eleven countries-Belgium, the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United
Kingdom-on the basis of their reductions in Iranian oil imports. Rubenfeld, Clinton
Names Waiver Recipients, supra note 120. Notable among the waiver recipients is
Japan, which, despite its heavy reliance on Iranian oil and its energy and economic
difficulties in the wake of the March 2011 tsunami, id., was able to significantly reduce
its Iranian oil imports in order to obtain a waiver. Samuel Rubenfeld, Japan Cheers U.S.
Sanctions Waiver, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/03/21/japan-cheers-us-sanctions-waiver.
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C. Non-State Terrorism Sanctions
Although the United States has continued to implement its
Cold War mainstay programs against Cuba and North Korea, the
1990s and 2000s were more notable as the decades in which the
United States expanded its use of sanctions to address a new array
of foreign policy objectives.' The United States'
counterterrorism sanctions program was perhaps the most
prominent in this respect. 86 As explained in Section D above,
antiterrorism sanctions began in 1980s as a response to incidents
of state-sponsored bombings and other acts of aggression.'18  The
1990s, however, saw the decline of state sponsorship and the rise
of non-state terrorist actors, most prominently Osama bin Laden's
al-Qaeda network.'" The emergence of non-state terrorist actors
necessitated a change in the U.S. approach to sanctions, as broad,
state-targeted measures were ineffectual.'89 This change came in
1995 when President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,947190
(EO 12,947), the first targeted or "smart" sanctions issued against
terrorist organizations.' 9 ' EO 12,947 directed that the U.S.-based
assets of entities deemed to be a threat to the Middle East peace
process be frozen, and prohibited transactions between the entities
and either U.S. nationals or any other persons within the United
States.' 92
185 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
186 Id. Though U.S. counterterrorism sanctions were probably the most well-
known, the counternarcotics sanctions were arguably more significant in terms of scope
and impact, since they have reached a number of legitimate and well-known businesses
in Latin America as well as property and companies within the United States. Id. They
have also resulted in leverage for the extradition of certain narcotics traffickers and have
had a real impact on the stability of the government in Colombia. Id.
187 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
188 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 142; see also Lippman, supra note 101, at
302-08 (discussing the emergence and ideology of radical Islamic terrorist groups).
189 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 142; see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic
Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 306 (1987)
("Sanctions designed to impose economic costs are largely irrelevant to terrorism carried
on without state support; they are too blunt an instrument to be used in pressuring small
groups of terrorists.").
190 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
191 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 142; see also Lord et al., supra note 7,
at 278.
192 See Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. at 5079-81.
2013 763
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The September 1 1th attacks radically altered U.S. sanctions
policy as it pertained to counterterrorism, to put it mildly.1 93 In the
wake of the attacks, President Bush issued Executive Order
13,224,194 which declared a national emergency, expanded the
application of economic sanctions to persons assisting or
otherwise associated with designated terrorists, and authorized the
Secretaries of State and Treasury to designate additional terrorists
and their supporters as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists"
(SDGTs).195 By expanding the scope of U.S. counterterrorism
sanctions to include terrorists outside of the Middle East, the Bush
administration established "the international financial equivalent
of law enforcement's 'most wanted' list."1 96  Additionally, the
USA PATRIOT Act, 97 enacted in October 2001, expanded
executive authority under IEEPA in several key ways, including:
(1) allowing "the executive branch to submit classified evidence in
camera and ex parte in court proceedings against alleged
financiers of terrorism";9' (2) permitting "OFAC to block assets
during the pendency, rather than after the conclusion, of an
investigation";1 99 and (3) granting the President the ability "to
confiscate any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States of any foreign person, organization, or country determined
to have planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in terrorist
hostilities or attacks against the United States."2 00
These expanded powers strengthened the U.S. sanctions
regime and adapted it to serve as a vital counterterrorism tool.2 0'
193 Incidentally, before the attacks of September 11th, the Bush administration
sought reductions in the U.S. regulatory regime and an increased dependence on
multilateral efforts to prevent illicit money flows. Vanessa Ortblad, Comment, Criminal
Prosecution in Sheep's Clothing: The Punitive Effects of OFAC Freezing Sanctions, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439, 1444 (2007-2008).
194 Exec. Order No. No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
195 See id at 49,079-80.
196 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 16.
197 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272-402 (2001).
198 Ortblad, supra note 193, at 1444; see also PATRIOT Act § 106.
199 Id.
200 Id
201 George W. Bush, President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act, WHITE HOUSE OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (March 9, 2006,
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One group of commentators points to three broad strategies
pursued by the Bush administration under this evolved sanctions
regime: (1) to "cast a wide net in sanctioning" non-state terrorist
entities; (2) to "buttress multilateral sanctions regimes"; and (3) to
induce cooperation by previously targeted countries in the war on
terror by offering incentives in the form of lifted sanctions.20 2 In
pursuit of these strategies, OFAC has overseen a colossal
expansion in U.S. sanctions against terrorist entities; the agency
now implements terrorism sanctions under four parts of the Code
of Federal Regulations, imposing asset and transaction freezes on
roughly 3800 designated terrorists and terrorist entities.20 3
D. Regime Change and Human Rights
In addition to maintaining sanctions programs against Cuba,
WMD proliferation, and terrorism, the United States employed
sanctions through the 1990s to produce regime changes in
response to human rights violations.204 In fact, regime change
sanctions accounted for more than half of the sanctions programs
initiated in the 1990s, and they frequently involved the
coordinated efforts of the United States and other parties,
particularly the European Union.205
2:46 PM), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/
20060309-4.html ("It is a piece of legislation that's vital to win the war on terror and to
protect the American people.").
202 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 142.
203 A search of the text version of the SDN List, see OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SPECIALLY DESIGNATED
NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS ("SDN LIST"), yields 3794 results for "SDGT."
Currently, all FTOs are also designated as SDGTs, and about half of the 39 SDTs are
also SDGTs. See Specially Designated Nationals Search, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas.gov/Default.aspx (last visited July 24, 2012) (providing a
search-by-program function). Thus, the current number of SDGTs accurately represents
the number of terrorist designees on the SDN List.
204 While in the 1960s and 1970s "regime change" sanctions were typically
imposed in response to foreign policy disputes between the United States and other
nations, in the late 1970s such sanctions evolved into a tool to support broad human
rights demands and, in the 1990s, to encourage democratic reforms and good
governance. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 13-14 (chronicling the
development of "regime change" sanctions from the early 1960s through the end of the
20th century); see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
205 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 14 ("[R]egime change broadly defined
has been a recurring theme in the post-Cold War period, accounting for nearly half of the
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United States' use of economic sanctions to force regime
change has continued into the twenty-first century, with the most
recent example of this approach being the U.S. government's
response to the Arab Spring.20 6 For example, shortly after Libyan
security forces fired on civilian demonstrators in Benghazi,20 7 the
United States imposed comprehensive sanctions restricting trade
with and blocking the assets of the Libyan government and related
persons. 2 08  The effecting executive order also authorized the
Treasury Secretary and the OFAC to identify and designate
additional persons for asset freezes and transaction bans.209 in
sanctions initiated during the 1990s."); see also id. at 14 (identifying coordinated
sanctions efforts against Malawi, Niger, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Burundi,
The Gambia, and Ivory Coast). This stands in contrast to regime change sanctions in the
1970s and 1980s, which were typically unilateral U.S. initiatives against Latin American
countries. Id. at 14-15.
206 See Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, In Tougher Line, U.S. Announces
Sanctions on Libya and Shuts Embassy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at Al (reporting on
the imposition of sanctions against Mumar Gaddafi in Libya); see also Exec. Order No.
13,566, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,315 (Feb. 25, 2011) (ordering sanctions on Gaddafi and his
family).
207 Precipitated by popular revolts in neighboring countries Egypt and Tunisia, the
Libyan civil war began with a series of protests in mid-February 2011 that culminated in
a "Day of Rage" on February 17th. See Jack Healy, Popular Rage Is Met with Violence
in Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A12. The protests were met with violence by
the Libyan government. Id. Libya's strict media controls limited accounts of the
violence, with reports of deaths tolls on the "Day of Rage" ranging from four to twenty
and reports of dozens wounded. Id. Days later, Libyan security forces opened fire on
the funerals of protestors killed in prior demonstrations. Nick Meo, Libya Protests: 140
'Massacred' as Gaddafi Sends in Snipers to Crush Dissent, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 20,
2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8335934
/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html. As
the protests continued into late February, Gaddafi responded with increasing military
force. See Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi Massing Forces as Revolt
Nears Tripoli, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, at Al.
208 Several days after news agencies reported that the Libyan military was attacking
protestors, the United States imposed sanctions against Gaddafi and his regime. See
Cooper & Landler, supra note 206, at Al ("The tougher American response came nine
days into the Libyan crisis and six days after Colonel Qaddafi's security forces first
opened fire on protesters at a funeral in Benghazi, plunging Libya into something close
to civil war and igniting worldwide condemnation."). The United States imposed the
new sanctions "[j]ust minutes after a charter flight left Tripoli carrying the last
Americans who wanted to leave Libya," a cautionary measure taken because the exiting
Americans feared that Gaddafi would harm the flight's passengers. Id.
209 See Exec. Order No. 13,566, 76 Fed. Reg. at 11,315-17.
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blocking "the Government of Libya, its agencies,
instrumentalities, and controlled entities," Executive Order
13,566210 departed from the targeted sanctions methods developed
over the preceding ten to fifteen years in that it did not specifically
designate the entities to be subject to sanctions. 2 11 Rather, it left to
the public the determination of whether a particular entity fell
within the ambit of the restrictions.2 12
The 2011 sanctions against Syria were similar in purpose to
the Libya sanctions, though different in approach.2 13 Unlike with
Libya, the United States already had fairly extensive sanctions in
place against the Syrian government before the al-Assad regime
responded to public demonstrations with military force.2 14 The
210 Id.
211 Lord et al., supra note 7, at 283-284; see also Exec. Order No. 13,566, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 11,318 (listing only members of Gaddafi's family).
212 See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 283-284 (noting that the Libya sanctions were
the first since the 1997 Sudan sanctions to block the assets of a large category of persons
while "leav[ing] the regulated public with the responsibility of identifying for themselves
entities whose property must be blocked"). OFAC clarified the scope of these broad
measures within the first month of the Libya sanctions program by issuing an array of
general licenses. For a discussion of the use of general licenses as adaptive measures in
the Libya program, see infra notes 399-403 and accompanying text.
213 See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 276 ("The Libya sanctions grew and contracted
over the course of the year . .. [while] the Syria sanctions show a gradual tightening of
an already relatively robust embargo .... As regime change in places across the Arab
world begins to seem more likely in other countries or regions, the Libyan and Syrian
experiences suggest paths that could be used to advocate regime change through targeted
sanctions rather than simply to punish recalcitrant behavior by rogue states using broad
brush country-wide sanctions.").
214 See id. at 276, 291 (contrasting the growing Libya sanctions with what started as
"an already relatively robust export embargo against Syria" and attributing previous U.S.
sanctions against Syria as due its role as a state sponsor of terrorism). Protests in Syria
began in early 2011 but were slow to take hold, with many suspecting that, despite the
presence of authoritarian rule, corruption, and economic hardship-factors that led to
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia-revolution would never catch on in the country. See
e.g., Rania Abouzeid, The Youth of Syria: The Rebels Are on Pause, TIME (Mar. 6,
2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2057454,00.html (contrasting the
varying sentiments held by young Syrians toward the Syrian government); Syria: 'A
Kingdom of Silence,' AL JAZEERA (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2011/02/201129103121562395.html (citing "a popular president, dreaded
security forces and religious diversity" as factors weighing against a full-fledged
uprising). Nevertheless, protests intensified in mid-March 2011, and despite early hints
of reform, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad soon responded with military force. See
Mariam Karouny & Yara Bayoumy, Assad Blames Unrest on Saboteurs, Pledges
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United States has had restrictive measures in place against Syria
since it designated the country as a state sponsor of terrorism in
1979.215 In April 2011, as the Syrian military resorted to
increasingly violent measures to quell protests, the United States
began to expand its Syria sanctions by designating additional
individuals for targeted sanctions.216 In August 2011, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13,582217 (EO 13,582), which
imposed sanctions against the entire Syrian government.2 18
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the modern U.S.
sanctions regime is comprised of a variety of restrictive measures
supporting diverse foreign policy goals, including
counterterrorism, WMD nonproliferation, and the protection of
basic human rights and democratic principles. 2 19  This evolution
and America's continuing economic hegemony have entrenched
Reforms, REUTERS (Jun 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-syria-
idUSTRE75JOAV20110620. The conflict is ongoing, and the United Nations, the Arab
League, and countries around the world, including Syria's neighboring countries Jordan
and Turkey, have condemned the al-Assad regime's use of violence against protesters.
Id. Presently, however, the United States has ruled out military intervention, resorting
instead to diplomatic pressure and sanctions. See Michael R. Gordon & Elisabeth
Bumiller, U.S. Military Sent to Jordan On Syria Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at Al
(reporting that "[t]he Obama administration has declined to intervene in the Syrian
conflict beyond providing communications equipment and other nonlethal assistance to
the rebels opposing the government of President Bashar al-Assad.).
215 Lord et al., supra note 7, at 291; see also supra note 102 and accompanying
text. Representing a thirty-year history of sanctions, the measures in place at the
beginning of 2011 included a prohibition on virtually all exports and re-exports regulated
by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security as well as a transaction
ban against numerous Syrian persons designated on the SDN List. Lord et al., supra
note 7, at 291.
216 Jasper Helder, United States, European Union, Switzerland, and Canada
Expand Sanctions on Trade with Syria (September 7, 2011), in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 409, 411 (2011); see also Lord et al., supra note 7, at 292.
217 Executive Order 13,582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 17, 2011).
218 Id. As will be discussed in Parts IV.D.2-3, while the Syria sanctions involved a
"gradual tightening" of sanctions, beginning with targeted measures against certain
individuals and organizations and expanding by late summer 2011 to a freeze on Syrian
government assets and a comprehensive embargo on Syrian imports and exports, the
Libya sanctions were initially extremely stringent and gradually loosened over the course
of a year as the provisional government assumed control. Lord et al., supra note 7, at
276, 292. By contrast, the August 2011 expansion of the Syria sanctions program came
with a set of general licenses covering anticipated areas of ambiguity or concern. For a
discussion of these licenses, see infra notes 418-423 and accompanying text.
219 See supra Parts III.C-D and accompanying text.
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220the OFAC as the dominant force in global sanctions.
IV. OFAC and the Administration of U.S. Sanctions Protocols
Since 1950, OFAC has been the agency responsible for
implementing U.S. economic sanctions. 22 1  According to its
mission statement, OFAC "administers and enforces economic and
trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security
goals."222 Although the U.S. Constitution vests the power to
regulate trade with Congress, when it comes to sanctions,
Congress has traditionally delegated that authority to the
President, most prominently via TWEA, IEEPA, and the Export
Administration Act (EAA). 223  "Together, these statutes provide
the main legal basis for the most comprehensive economic
sanctions regime in modem history."2 24
220 Id
221 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
222 Mission of OFAC, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/
organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx (follow
"Mission" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 12, 2013) (listing OFAC's targets as "[certain]
foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those
engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States").
223 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (2006). Though technically speaking the EEA is
expired, President Clinton kept the export controls promulgated thereunder in force
pursuant to his emergency authority under IEEPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed.
Reg. 43,437, 43,437-38 (Aug. 19, 1994). For a discussion and history of the EAA and
subsequent amendments, see ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 97-106. The U.S.
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security is OFAC's analogue with
respect to U.S. export controls. See id. at 98-99, 105. Although mentioning U.S. export
controls where necessary for context, this Article focuses on the economic sanctions
imposed under the authority of TWEA and IEEPA. See generally id. (focusing on the
asset freezes and transaction bans implemented by OFAC).
Though typically delegating sanctioning authority to the President, Congress has
in some cases codified existing sanctions regulations as federal statutory law, thus
removing the President's authority to reduce those sanctions below their statutory levels.
See id. at 106 ("The [Iran/Libya Sanctions Act] ... reflected Congress's intent to codify
certain U.S. sanctions practices against Iran and Libya and to restrict the president's
discretion to manage sanctions policy against Iran and Libya .... ); see also id at 111
("Another statute where Congress intervened to limit executive discretion in the
management of U.S. sanctions policy was [the Helms-Burton Act, an objective of
which] .. . was to codify the then-thirty four year-old U.S. economic embargo against
Cuba.").
224 ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 92.
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A. Types of Sanctions Programs Administered by OFAC
OFAC currently administers twenty-two different sanctions
programs.225 These programs vary in scope and severity. The
Cuba sanctions, for instance, impose a near total embargo on all
goods and services.2 26 In addition, programs targeting Iran,227
Syria,228 and Sudan,229 though somewhat less severe than the Cuba
sanctions, significantly restrict trade with the targeted country, its
government, or its nationals, while allowing for limited categories
of transactions.230 OFAC also administers a number of programs
225 See Sanctions Programs and Country Information, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx (last
visited Jan. 13, 2013).
226 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text; see also supra Section III.A.
227 The Iran sanctions approach the level of comprehensiveness seen with the Cuba
sanctions, particularly in light of CISADA. See supra notes 168-184 and accompanying
text (discussing CISADA); see also An Overview of O.F.A.C Regulations Involving
Sanctions Against Iran, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL (2011) (describing import, export, transaction, and financial services bans),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf
[hereinafter Overview of OFAC Iran Sanctions Regulations].
228 See supra notes 213-218 and accompanying text (introducing the Syria
sanctions).
229 The Sudan program imposes comprehensive sanctions against that nation,
including asset freezes against the Sudanese government and other designees, a
transaction ban, and a ban on financial dealings, among other restrictions. See An
Overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/s
anctions/Programs/Documents/sudan.pdf. This program contains an important carve-
out, however, for certain marginalized areas of Sudan, such as Southern Sudan and
Darfur. Id. The carve-out generally exempts the specified areas from the Sudan
sanctions, with the notable exception of the ban on transactions related to the petroleum
or petrochemical industries of Sudan. Id.
230 Burma, or Myanmar, was also subject to comprehensive U.S. sanctions, mainly
for political repression and anti-democratic actions, though the exportation of goods and
non-financial services to Myanmar was generally allowed. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, BURMA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
BURMESE SANCTIONS REGULATIONS 1-3 (2008) (describing, among other restrictions,
asset freezes, an import ban, a financial services export ban, and a ban on new
investment). Recent political reforms in Myanmar led the United States to ease its
longtime sanctions against that country. See Annie Lowrey, Myanmar: U.S. Eases
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A8. The United States also levied
comprehensive sanctions against Libya at the onset of the Libyan civil war, but these
initially broad measures have largely been drawn down with general licenses. See infra
notes 410-417 and accompanying text.
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that, although tied to a particular geographic region or country, in
actuality target designated bad actors within that region
determined to be responsible for the repression of democracy,
human rights abuses, political destabilization, or other
wrongdoing. 231 The five remaining OFAC programs are not tied
to a geographic region, but instead target persons deemed to be
engaged in illicit activities such as terrorism, WMD proliferation,
and narcotics trafficking.2 32
Individuals and entities designated by the President or his
designee under one of the aforementioned programs are added to
the SDN List.233 The SDN List is an administrative tool managed
by OFAC for the purpose of providing a single reference listing all
persons designated under a U.S. sanctions program.2 34 The assets
under U.S. jurisdiction of persons identified on the SDN List are
blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from
transacting with such persons.23 5 OFAC publishes and frequently
231 These programs target persons undermining democratic processes and
institutions in Belarus; persons threatening international stabilization efforts in the
Western Balkans; former members of the previous government of Iraq (although several
general licenses have nullified many of the sanctions); persons who were involved with
the former regime of Charles Taylor, or who unlawfully depleted Liberian resources;
persons contributing to the conflict in C6te d'lvoire; persons contributing to the conflict
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; persons contributing to the conflict in
Somalia; and persons undermining democratic processes in Zimbabwe. See generally
Sanctions Programs and Country Information, supra note 225 (listing all sanctions
programs that OFAC currently enforces). The North Korea sanctions may be considered
among these programs, as the sanctions principally target individuals and entities
designated as facilitating North Korean arms trafficking, procurement of luxury goods,
or engaging in other illicit activities that involve or support the North Korean
government. See OFAC, OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS, supra note 78, at 2.
The North Korea sanctions are notably more severe, however, in that they include a ban
on all imports from North Korea, whereas the other programs listed above are strictly
list-based. See id. at 3 (summarizing the import ban).
232 These targeted classes of bad actors include WMD proliferators and their
supporters; persons engaging in international narcotics trafficking; persons who commit,
threaten to commit, or support terrorism; traffickers of rough diamonds not controlled
through the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme; and transnational criminal
organizations. See generally Sanctions Programs and Country Information, supra note
225 (listing all sanctions programs that OFAC currently enforces).
233 Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), supra note 21.
234 Werner Interview, supra note 24; see also Specially Designated Nationals List
(SDN), supra note 21.
235 Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), supra note 21 ("U.S. persons are
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updates the SDN List, which it makes available on its website.23 6
B. Penalties for Violations
United States persons who fail to comply with OFAC's
sanctions face stiff civil and criminal penalties.23 7 For a person
found to be in violation of U.S. sanctions, IEEPA permits OFAC
to impose a maximum civil penalty of $250,000 or twice the
amount of the transaction underlying the sanctions violation,
whichever is greater.2 38 In determining the amount of a civil
penalty, OFAC considers whether the violation was voluntarily
disclosed and whether, based on an array of factors, the violation
was "egregious."2 39 IEEPA also allows for criminal penalties.
Criminal penalties are reserved for "willful" violators of U.S.
sanctions, and IEEPA caps such penalties at $1,000,000, or, if the
violator is a natural person, up to twenty years in prison.240
generally prohibited from dealing with [individuals, groups, and entities listed on the
SDN List].").
236 Id.
237 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2011) (providing criminal penalties); id §
1705(c) (providing civil penalties).
238 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2011). An amendment to IEEPA established this cap in
2007. James E. Bartlett III et al., Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 42 INT'L
LAW. 301, 301-02 (2008). Civil penalties for violations of TWEA-based sanctions-for
example, Cuba- remain capped by statute at $65,000. See 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A, pt.
V.B.2.a. (2011) (outlining the "Base Category Calculation" for civil penalties for
sanctions violations); see also Wendy L. Wysong, Matthew B. Hsu & Elaine Banar,
When is Enough, Enough? The Unforeseen Risks of U.S. Economic Sanctions and Export
Controls on Financial Institutions, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 415, 422-25
(2008) (summarizing the guidelines OFAC uses to determine civil penalties).
239 See generally 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A (providing "a general framework for the
enforcement of all economic sanctions programs administered by [OFAC]"). In
determining whether a violation is "egregious," OFAC considers, among other factors,
whether the violation was willful or reckless, whether the violator was aware of the
conduct at issue, and the harm to the sanctions program's objectives. Id pt. V.B. 1.
240 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c); see also 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A, pt. II.F. ("In appropriate
circumstances, OFAC may refer the matter to appropriate law enforcement agencies for
criminal investigation and/or prosecution. Apparent sanctions violations that OFAC has
referred for criminal investigation and/or prosecution also may be subject to OFAC civil
penalty or other administrative action."). Criminal penalties under TWEA for
organizations are capped at $1,000,000, as they are under IEEPA. Id. §
501.701(b). TWEA penalty caps for individuals are slightly below their IEEPA
counterparts. Individuals who violate TWEA sanctions may be imprisoned for a
maximum of 10 years and fined the greater of $250,000 or twice the transaction value.
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OFAC follows certain procedures when imposing penalties. 241
Penalty imposition begins with OFAC sending the alleged violator
a pre-penalty notice indicating the suspected violation and a
proposed penalty amount.24 2  The pre-penalty notice initiates a
period, typically lasting thirty days, during which the respondent
may make a written presentation in its defense.243  Barring a
settlement or a finding that in fact no violation occurred, OFAC
then issues a penalty notice, which informs the respondent of the
amount of the penalty and sets a payment deadline, typically thirty
days from the issuance of the penalty notice.24 The penalty notice
constitutes final agency action, which the respondent may appeal
to federal court.245
In recent years, OFAC assessed increasingly significant
penalties.2 46 From 2006 to 2008, OFAC brought 192 enforcement
Id. §§ 501.701(a), (b).
241 See generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.703-.747 (detailing the procedural rules for
TWEA penalty purposes).
242 Id. § 501 app. A, pt. V.A.1.
243 Id. pt. V.A. L-2. See, e.g., id. § 537.702(b) ("The pre-penalty notice also shall
inform the respondent of the respondent's right to make a written presentation within the
applicable 30-day period .. . as to why a monetary penalty should not be imposed or
why, if imposed, the monetary penalty should be in a lesser amount than proposed.").
244 Id § 501 app. A, pt. V.A.3 (2011). See, e.g., id. § 537.704(b)(2) ("The penalty
notice shall inform the respondent that payment or arrangement for installment payment
of the assessed penalty must be made within 30 days of the date of mailing of the penalty
notice by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.").
245 Id. at pt. V.A.5. See, e.g., id. § 537.704(b)(4) ("The issuance of the penalty
notice finding a violation and imposing a monetary penalty shall constitute final agency
action. The respondent has the right to seek judicial review of that final agency action in
federal district court."). Penalty procedures under the TWEA differ slightly in that they
require an administrative review process before an appeal in federal court is available.
Upon receiving a penalty notice, the respondent may request a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) instead of paying the penalty within the thirty-day
period. Id. § 501.703(a)(3). If the respondent requests a hearing, OFAC, assuming it
decides against discontinuing the penalty action based on the information submitted by
the respondent, issues an "Order Instituting Proceedings" and refers the matter to an ALJ
for a decision. Id. § 501.703(a)(4). The designee of the Treasury Secretary may then
review the ALJ's decision. Id. §§ 501.703(a)(5)-(6). The ALJ's decision, or, if reviewed,
the determination of the Secretary's designee, then becomes a final decision of the
Treasury Department, which the respondent may appeal to federal court. Id. §§
501.703(a)(5)-(7).
246 The figures were taken from OFAC's website. See Civil Penalties and
Enforcement Information, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (listing
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actions that resulted in penalties or settlements totaling around
$48.56 million.247 By contrast, from 2009 to 2011, though OFAC
assessed penalties or reached settlements in only 75 enforcement
actions, amounts recovered totaled over $1.064 billion.2 48 OFAC
reached settlements during this period with major U.S. and
international financial services firms such as J.P. Morgan Chase,2 49
Barclays,250  Lloyds TSB,25 1 and Credit Suisse, with some
settlements reaching into the hundreds of millions of dollars.253 in
June 2012, OFAC announced a $619 million settlement with ING
Bank N.V. (ING), then the largest OFAC penalty in history.2 54
enforcement totals for 2008 onward).
247 See id Totals for this period were derived from OFAC's individual reports on
its enforcement actions.
248 See id.
249 See Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/
jpmorgan.pdf (detailing a settlement of $88,300,000).
250 See Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control and Barclays Bank PLC, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Aug. 18,
2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/
Documents/0818201 0.pdf (detailing a settlement of $176,000,000).
251 See Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control and Lloyds TSB Bank, plc, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Dec. 22,
2009), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/
Documents/lloyds agreement.pdf (detailing a settlement of $217,000,000).
252 See Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control and Credit Suisse AG, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/
12162009.pdf (detailing a settlement of $536,000,000).
253 In December 2009, Credit Suisse agreed to pay a $536,000,000 fine, the largest
ever at the time. Marilyn Muench & Robert Shapiro, Swiss Bank Pays Record $536
Million Fine for OFAC Violations: US. Banks May Want to Review Relevant
Procedures, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (Jan. 2010), http://documents.jdsupra.com/6
5f898b7-4490-48e0-a7db-dad353dflO4b.pdf. The severity of the fine resulted from
Credit Suisse's continual and willful violations of the Iran, Burma, Sudan, Cuba, Libya,
and Charles Taylor regime sanctions. Id. Attorney General Eric Holder described the
violations as a "simply astounding" level of "criminal misconduct." Id.
254 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
U.S. Treasury Department Announces $619 Million Settlement with ING Bank, N.V.
(June 12, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tgl612.aspx. The settlement "resolve[d] OFAC's investigation into ING's intentional
manipulation and deletion of information about U.S.-sanctioned parties in more than
20,000 financial and trade transactions routed through third-party banks located in the
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The historic fine against ING was eclipsed later that year, in
December 2012, when HSBC reached a $1.92 billion settlement
with OFAC and several other criminal and regulatory authorities
for alleged sanctions and money-laundering violations.255 Also in
December, Standard Chartered reached an agreement with federal
and local authorities to pay $667 million in connection with
violations of U.S. sanctions.
United States between 2002 and 2007, primarily in apparent violation" of the Cuba, Iran,
Sudan, and Libya sanctions programs. Id. For example, "[bleginning in the 1990s, at
the instruction of senior bank management, ING employees in Curaqao began omitting
references to Cuba in payment messages sent to the United States in order to prevent
U.S. financial institutions from identifying and interdicting prohibited transactions." Id.
The practice of removing and omitting such information was also used by other
branches of ING's Wholesale Banking Division, including in France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands, in processing U.S. dollar payments and trade finance transactions through
the United States. Id. In addition, ING's senior management in France authorized,
advised in the creation of, and ultimately provided fraudulent endorsement stamps for
use by Cuban financial institutions in processing traveler's check transactions, which
disguised the involvement of Cuban banks in these transactions when they were
processed through the United States. Id. Moreover, ING's Trade and Commodity
Finance business at its Wholesale Banking branch in the Netherlands routed payments
made on behalf of U.S.-sanctioned Cuban clients through other corporate clients to
obscure the sanctioned clients' identities, and ING's Romanian branch omitted details
from a letter of credit involving a U.S. financial institution in order to finance the
exportation of U.S.-origin goods to Iran. Id. ING reached simultaneous settlements with
OFAC as well as the U.S. Department of Justice, "the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
District of Columbia, the Department of Justice's National Security Division, the
Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, and the New
York County District Attorney's Office." Id
255 Howard Mustoe, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion in US. Money-Laundering Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-1 1/hsbc-agrees-
to-pay-1-92-billion-in-money-laundeing-settlement.html. This included an $875 million
settlement with the Treasury Department, "the largest collective settlement in the
department's history." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign
Assets Control, Treasury Department Reaches Landmark Settlement with HSBC (Dec.
12, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tgl799.aspx. HSBC was alleged to have altered its transaction records to obscure
information about its clients in so-called "U-turn" transactions, which involved the
transfer of funds from Iranian to non-U.S. banks through U.S. financial institutions.
Mustoe, supra. HSBC reportedly executed similar transactions with other sanctioned
countries including North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, and Burma. Id. On top of these
allegations, the bank was accused of giving terrorists and narcotics traffickers access to
the U.S. financial system, in violation of U.S. sanctions and anti-money laundering
regulations. Id.
256 Jeffrey Sparshott, Standard Chartered Settles U.S. Sanctions Allegations, WALL.
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732447830457
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C. OFAC's Licensing Practices
The holistic sanctions programs OFAC favors carry a
significant risk of excess.2 57 The broad-based, categorical
restrictions against U.S. persons doing business with certain
countries can create conflict of law scenarios as well as frustrate
activities that are deemed benign and not inconsistent with U.S.
foreign policy.258 They can also disproportionately impact
innocent citizens and businesses in the targeted countries whose
interests the United States is trying to protect by imposing
sanctions in the first place.25 9 To control for the potential excesses
of such a system, the agency employs a robust licensing
practice.2 60
OFAC processes tens of thousands of license and interpretative
guidance requests annually.2 6 1 While the bulk of these are Cuban
travel license requests under the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act 2 62 (TSRA), 263  some implement specific
8171150886564188.html. The fine comprised a $327 million settlement with the Justice
Department as well as a $340 million settlement with New York's Department of
Financial Services. Id. From 2001 to 2007, Standard Chartered had "omitted or
removed references to U.S.-sanctioned locations, effectively obscuring the fact that the
funds originated from countries such as Iran, Libya and Sudan," according to U.S.
officials. Id.
257 See infra Part IV.D.2.
258 See id.
259 See id.
260 See infra Parts IV.C.1-2.
261 See Examining Treasury's Role in Combating Terrorist Fin. Five Years After 9/
11: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 37
(2006) (statement of Adam J. Szubin, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control) ("We
review and process tens of thousands of license and interpretive guidance requests a
year, filed by individuals, firms, and multinational corporations, each of which requires
careful consideration, and some of which entail sophisticated transactional analysis.");
Oversight of the Dep't of Treasury: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 91 (2004) (statement of R.
Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control) ("[OFAC's] Licensing
Division reviews, analyzes and responds to more than 25,000 requests per year for
specific licenses covering a broad range of trade, financial and travel-related
transactions .... ).
262 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-11
(2011).
263 See Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations., 108th Cong. 22-23 (2003) (statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Dir.,
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U.S. foreign policy decisions.2" Others respond to the inevitable
conflicts and unanticipated situations that arise under any
comprehensive sanctions regime.26 5 OFAC's pervasive use of
licensing reflects the agency's proclivity to assert its jurisdiction
broadly, making any needed curtailments by granting exemptions,
rather than running the risk of under-regulating. 26 6
OFAC licenses typically entitle the licensee or a larger class of
persons to engage in a transaction or transactions that would
Office of Foreign Assets Control) ("The largest volume of license applications processed
by our office has traditionally involved travel to Cuba and by far the largest proportion
of these applications, more than 90 percent, relate to visits by close relatives. . . . This
category of travel is handled by our Miami office, which processed nearly 20,000 such
applications last year."); Werner Interview, supra note 24; see also infra notes 354-63
and accompanying text (discussing the TSRA). This focus on the Cuba embargo was
criticized in a 2007 U.S. Government and Accountability Office Report as potentially
detracting from OFAC's responsibilities in more pressing matters of national security:
[I]n light of OFAC's responsibilities for administering more than 20 sanctions
programs, including sanctions against countries engaged in terrorism, weapons
proliferations, and narcotics trafficking, we recommend that the Secretary of the
Treasury direct OFAC to assess its allocation of resources for investigating and
penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo with respect to the numerous other
sanctions programs it administers.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-80, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: AGENCIES
FACE COMPETING PRIORITIES IN ENFORCING THE U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA 61 (2007).
President Obama recently eased restrictions on Cuba travel licenses, reinstating
"people-to-people" licenses, which permit travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba for cultural
and educational purposes. See Michelle Higgins, New Ways to Visit Cuba, Legally, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2011, at TR3. "People-to-people" licenses are not passes to engage in
traditional tourism. Id. "Rather, the focus is on meeting local citizens and learning
about the culture, not beach hopping and mojito-swilling." Id. Nevertheless, U.S.
organizers of trips to Cuba expect American travel to increase dramatically from levels
observed during the Bush administration. See id ("[People-to-people licenses] stopped
being issued in 2003 under travel restrictions imposed by President George W. Bush.
Subsequently, the number of travelers from the United States visiting Cuba legally
dropped from more than 200,000 in 2003 to less than 50,000 in 2004, according to
estimates by Bob Guild, vice president of Marazul Charters in North Bergen, N.J.,
among the largest United States organizers of trips to Cuba. The new changes, which
come on top of loosened restrictions for Cubans and Cuban-Americans visiting relatives
in Cuba, are expected to push the number of travelers visiting Cuba this year to
450,000 .... ).
264 See, e.g., infra notes 289-292 and accompanying text (discussing how the
United States, in an effort to improve relations with North Korea, relaxed its trade
embargo on that country through the use of licenses).
265 See OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 74.
266 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
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otherwise be prohibited by one of the U.S. sanctions programs.26
OFAC issues two types of licenses: (1) general licenses,268 which
are made public and provide universal exemptions to a given set of
sanctions, and (2) specific licenses, which are granted only upon
application and authorize only the applicant to engage in a specific
transaction or category of transaction, often with significant
limitations and reporting requirements.2 69
1. General Licenses
General licenses are set forth in OFAC's published regulations
and authorize particular types of transactions for a class of
persons.2 70 If a general license covers a transaction, the class of
persons specified in the general license can engage in that activity
without having to apply individually to OFAC for permission.2 7'
The class of persons is often U.S. persons generally,27 2 but in some
267 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 74.
268 Around half of OFAC's 22 current sanctions programs have general licenses in
place. See Sanctions Programs and Country Information, supra note 225 (listing
OFAC's sanctions programs; the webpages for the individual programs typically indicate
whether there are general licenses in effect).
269 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
270 OFACFAQ, supra note 34, at 74.
271 Persons engaging in generally licensed transactions, however, must take care to
strictly observe any restrictions in the general license. Id.; see, e.g., OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, EXECUTIVE ORDER 13582 OF AUGUST 17,
2011, BLOCKING PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA, GENERAL LICENSE No. 8: OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2011) ("Any U.S. person engaging in or facilitating
transactions authorized pursuant to this general license shall keep a full and accurate
record of each such transaction, including any supporting documentation, and such
record shall be available for examination for at least five (5) years after the date of the
transaction.").
272 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13582 OF AUGUST 17, 2011, BLOCKING PROPERTY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
SYRIA, SYRIA GENERAL LICENSE No. 5: EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN SERVICES INCIDENT TO
INTERNET-BASED COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORIZED (2011) ("[T]he exportation from the
United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Syria of services
incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant
messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web
browsing, and blogging, is authorized, provided that such services are publicly available
at no cost to the user.").
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cases OFAC will specify a narrower class.273
General licenses serve a variety of purposes. OFAC often
issues general licenses to resolve ambiguities or uncertainties in a
given sanctions program, which arise most commonly in programs
imposing broad measures.2 74 In cases where ambiguity or
uncertainty is unanticipated, OFAC may issue general licenses in
response to a deluge of specific license applications voicing
similar concerns.2 75 Where possible, however, OFAC prefers to
anticipate these problems and pair new regulations with
appropriate general licenses. 276
This was the case with the sanctions imposed against the
Palestinian Authority in 2006.277 In the 2006 Palestinian
parliamentary elections, Hamas, a designated terrorist entity under
several U.S. sanctions programs, won a majority of seats from the
Fatah party.278 Hamas' victory and newfound position of power
within the Palestinian Authority led OFAC to prohibit transactions
between U.S. citizens and the Authority, on the ground that Hamas
had a property interest in those transactions. 279  Five general
273 See, e.g., id. ("U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in
securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters are authorized to process funds
transfers for the operating expenses or other official business of third-country diplomatic
or consular missions in Syria .... ).
274 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
275 See, e.g., infra note 330 (discussing the swamping of OFAC's licensing division
in the early days of the recent Libya sanctions); see infra notes 388-92, 404-07 and
accompanying text (discussing how the United States used general licenses in its Libya
sanctions program to respond to compliance difficulties).
276 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
277 Another more recent example of OFAC bundling new sanctions with
anticipatory general licenses was the recent ratcheting up of the Syria sanctions
following the Syrian government's military response to civilian protests. See infra notes
414-420 and accompanying text (contrasting the United States' recent approaches to
sanctions in Libya and Syria); see also supra notes 213-218 (discussing generally the
conflict in Syria and recent U.S. sanctions there).
278 Steven Erlanger, Hamas Routs Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/27/international/
middleeast/27mideast.html?pagewanted=all.
279 See Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,199 (May 10,
2006) ("OFAC has determined that, as a result of the recent elections, HAMAS has a
property interest in the transactions of the Palestinian Authority. Accordingly ... U.S.
persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with the Palestinian Authority
unless authorized.").
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licenses accompanied this prohibition, however.280 Several of
these licenses were designed to ensure that the sanctions did not
unduly disrupt activity deemed legitimate and necessary, including
authorizations of transactions by U.N. officials and transactions
incident to the daily lives of U.S. citizens living in the region.28 '
Two of the general licenses focused on targeting the wrongdoers
while minimizing collateral damage.282 General License No. 4
focused the pressure on Hamas by permitting transactions with
Fatah party leader President Mahmoud Abbas and his affiliates,
the Palestinian judiciary, and non-Hamas members of the
Palestinian Legislative Council.28 3 General License No. 6
authorized in-kind donations of medicine, medical devices, and
medical services to the Ministry of Health.284
There is an advantage in bundling new sanctions with general
licenses in this way. General licenses authorize the types of
transactions that the U.S. government has no interest in
frustrating. 28 5  The President can, of course, cancel a sanctions
program by executive order.286 When the United States
promulgates such exemptions as licenses rather than full-fledged
executive or legislative measures, however, OFAC retains the
ability to revoke or amend the exemptions in the case of abuse or
changed circumstances.287 Even when OFAC revokes a general
license, specific licensing remains available to ensure that
legitimate and desirable transactions get through.288
280 See Counter Terrorism Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/terror.aspx (last
visited Jan. 13, 2013) (listing five general licenses issued on April 12, 2006).
281 See 31 C.F.R. § 594.510 (2012) (authorizing "[o]fficial activities of certain
international organizations; U.S. person employees of certain governments"); § 594.511
(authorizing certain "[t]ravel, employment, residence and maintenance transactions with
the Palestinian Authority"); § 594.12 (authorizing "[p]ayment of taxes and incidental
fees to the Palestinian Authority"); § 594.514 (authorizing the conclusion of preexisting
contractual and programmatic obligations with the Palestinian Authority).
282 See §§ 594.503-.504.
283 See § 594.513 (authorizing "[tlransactions with entities under the control of the
Palestinian President and certain other entities").
284 See § 594.515.
285 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
286 Id
287 Id
288 Id
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In other cases, OFAC may issue a general license to effectuate
or facilitate the actions or policies of a higher executive authority,
such as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, or the
President. 289 For example, as discussed in Part III.B above, in the
mid-1990s, in response to representations from North Korea that it
would suspend its nuclear program, the United States agreed to
reduce its trade and economic sanctions against North Korea,
which, until that point, constituted a virtual embargo on all
trade.2 90 In addition to amending the regulations it had in place,
OFAC issued general licenses allowing exports to North Korea,
investment in a number of North Korean industries, and brokered
transactions.29 1 OFAC also licensed the importation of most North
Korean-origin goods and raw materials, although these imports
required prior approval from OFAC and affirmations from the
importer that the importation of the goods was not otherwise
prohibited by various arms control measures that remained in
place.292
2. Specific Licenses
In addition to general licenses, OFAC issues specific licenses,
which authorize a particular transaction upon the written
application of the prospective licensee.2 93 OFAC's use of specific
licenses reflects the reality that in a comprehensive sanctions
regime, it is impossible to anticipate or generally authorize
everything.294 Unlike general licenses, specific licenses only
authorize the applicant to engage in the specified activity and are
typically not made public.295
289 Id
290 See Blageff, supra note 64, at 3-4; supra text accompanying notes 140-148. Of
course, North Korea became notorious for misleading the international community with
respect to its nuclear weapons technology research and development. See generally
Boehm, supra note 70, at 92-106 (summarizing North Korea's history of flouting its
non-proliferation obligations).
291 Blageff, supra note 64, at 4; see Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 38,165-66 (June 19, 2000).
292 Blageff, supra note 64, at 4; see Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 38,165-66.
293 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 74.
294 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
295 Id.; see OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 74. Occasionally, OFAC will publish a
redacted version of its response to a specific license request as guidance. See, e.g., Letter
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The requirements for an application for a specific license are
detailed in the Code of Federal Regulations.29 6 in general, requests
for specific licenses need not follow a specific format.297 OFAC
provides an application form only for a few categories of requests,
including applications for the release of funds blocked at a U.S.
financial institution and applications for licenses to export
agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran or
Sudan under the TSRA.298 As a baseline, however, every specific
license application must be in writing and provide a detailed
description of the proposed transaction and the names and
addresses of each of the individuals or companies involved.29 9
Additionally, the sanctions program under which the applicant
seeks a specific license may require additional information from
the applicant.300
OFAC's decision-making process with respect to specific
license applications is less than transparent.30 ' OFAC generally
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, to Unknown Recipient (Apr. 30, 2003) (addressing the provision of internet
access to informational materials to an Iranian entity), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ia043003.pdf.
296 See 31 C.F.R. 501.801(b) (2012).
297 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 75.
298 See OFAC Reporting and License Application Forms, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/forms-index.aspx (last visited
Jan. 13, 2013) (listing applications for licenses for travel to Cuba and licenses for certain
remittances to Cuban nationals). In the past decade, OFAC has issued nearly 10,000
licenses under the TSRA. Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov't Appropriations for Fiscal Year
2012: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 32
(2012) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
299 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 75.
300 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
GUIDANCE ON THE RELEASE OF LIMITED AMOUNTS OF BLOCKED FUNDS FOR PAYMENT OF
LEGAL FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN CHALLENGING THE BLOCKING OF U.S. PERSONS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE OR CIVIL PROCEEDINGS (2010); OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, LICENSING DIVISION, LICENSE APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR
EXPORTS TO IRAN AND SUDAN OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, MEDICINE, AND
MEDICAL DEVICES (providing guidelines for persons applying for licenses to export
goods allowed under the TSRA); OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, STATEMENT OF LICENSING POLICY REGARDING TRANSACTIONS WITH THREE
COLOMBIAN ENTITIES DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO E.O. 12978.
301 Some commentators have raised First Amendment concerns based on this lack
of transparency and what they view as an insufficient appeals process for license denials.
See Tracy J. Chin, Note, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How OFAC's Regulations Restrain
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does not publish the factors it takes into consideration when
making a determination on a specific license application.30 2
Additionally, although OFAC issues opinion letters, regulatory
interpretations, and other statements, the organization can change
its opinion without public notice. 303  This lack of transparency is
due in part to OFAC's desire to maintain its discretion and not
bind itself to any formula.30 4 Moreover, OFAC does not want to
create a specific licensing process that is so transparent as to
facilitate the fabrication by applicants of factual circumstances that
skirt U.S. sanctions.3 05
The length of time for a decision on a specific license varies
based on a number of factors, one of which is the extent to which
OFAC must coordinate with other government agencies.3 06
Sometimes an executive order mandates consultation with other
agencies.3 07 On other occasions, such consultation occurs simply
First Amendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1883, 1910-13 (2008) (suggesting ways
OFAC can reform its regulation of publishing activities to fix constitutional problems);
Nadia L. Luhr, Note, Iran, Social Media, and U.S. Trade Sanctions: The First
Amendment Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 500, 516-29
(2010) (discussing First Amendment problems with OFAC's regulatory scheme).
302 But see generally OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDELINES FOR LICENSE APPLICATIONS TO ENGAGE IN
TRAVEL-RELATED TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING CUBA (2011), [hereinafter OFAC, CUBA
TRAVEL LICENSE GUIDELINES] (summarizing travel-related general licenses and
providing the criteria for specific licenses, including examples of licensable activity for
each category of specific license).
303 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 14-15. OFAC therefore recommends exercising
caution when relying on such guidance. Id.
304 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
305 Id. The lack of transparency also reflects the reality that because OFAC's
sanctions programs deal with matters of national security and implement the foreign
policy of the United States, the actual basis for the licensing decision and the
considerations that are brought to bear cannot always be made public and subject to
debate and comment. Id These concerns are also evident in the fact that OFAC
generally promulgates regulations without the traditional notice and comment period. Id.
306 See OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 77 (listing such factors as "the complexity of
the transactions under consideration, the scope and detail of interagency coordination,
and the volume of similar applications awaiting consideration" and encouraging
applicants to wait "at least two weeks before telephonically contacting the Licensing
Division" with regard to an outstanding application).
307 See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,441, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,499 (Aug. 3, 2007) (blocking
the assets of "any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State" to have engaged in certain enumerated activities).
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out of respect for the functions and interests of other regulatory
bodies.308 For instance, if a specific license application raises
issues of foreign policy, such as a travel license under the Iran or
Cuba sanctions programs, OFAC often defers to the Department of
State.309 In addition, with respect to sanctioned countries, OFAC
handles some of the licensing of: (1) U.S. exports and (2) exports
and re-exports from other countries involving U.S.-origin goods or
technology and foreign products incorporating U.S. parts or based
on U.S. technology. In the licensing decisions that OFAC does
handle, OFAC coordinates with the Department of Commerce's
Office of Export Enforcement in making its decisions.3 10 For
license applications from an indicted person, OFAC will not make
a determination without consulting with the Department of
Justice.31 '
Licensing decisions are "final agency action[s]," and OFAC's
regulations do not provide for a formal appeals process.3 12  It is
308 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
309 See Corruption in the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program: Reaching a Consensus on
U.N. Reform: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Robert
Werner, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=c6d612e2-c256-4ffo-8012-27a71346625d
("OFAC referred travel applications to the Department of State for foreign policy
guidance in appropriate cases, such as when an applicant claimed a compelling
humanitarian consideration (e.g., a critical illness of an immediate family member in
Iraq), or where circumstances indicated that a national interest was at stake."); OFAC
FAQ, supra note 34, at 78 ("Many of OFAC's licensing determinations are guided by
U.S. foreign policy and national security concerns. Numerous issues often must be
coordinated with the U.S. Department of State . . . .").
310 Blageff, supra note 64, at 2; Werner Interview, supra note 24.
311 Werner Interview, supra note 24. Conversely, with regard to applications for
licenses to export agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices under the
TSRA, OFAC routinely grants licenses without consulting other agencies. Id. The
Department of State is generally kept apprised of such decisions, however. Id. In
addition to the agencies already named, OFAC also works directly with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Oilfor Influence:
How Saddam Used Oil to Reward Politicians Under the UN. Oil-for-Food Program:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Robert Werner, Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/
ws-psi-werner-ofac.
312 See 31 C.F.R. § 501.802 (2012) ("The Office of Foreign Assets Control will
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doubtful, moreover, that a formal appeals process would provide
much recourse for denied applicants. The U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia has held that because OFAC has
complete discretion over specific licensing decisions, "no
justiciable standard" exists for evaluating such decisions.313
Nonetheless, OFAC will reconsider an application for "good
cause," such as where the applicant can demonstrate "changed
circumstances" or "submit additional relevant evidence that was
not previously made available to OFAC."3 14  Additionally, the
applicant may request that OFAC explain why it denied a specific
license application. OFAC's responses to such requests are
often no more than a generic indication that the applicant's
described activity does not comport with U.S. foreign Policy.316
advise each applicant of the decision respecting filed applications. The decision of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Treasury with
respect to an application shall constitute final agency action."); OFAC FAQ, supra note
34, at 76 ("The regulations do not provide for a formal process of appeal."). Cf 31
C.F.R. §§ 501.703-.745 (2012) (detailing the administrative appeals process for penalties
imposed under TWEA); id. § 501.806 (describing "[p]rocedures for unblocking funds
believed to have been blocked due to mistaken identity"); id. § 501.807 (describing
"[p]rocedures governing delisting from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List").
313 See Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 2d 59, 76 n.22 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[B]ecause the specific
license decisions [are] left to the complete discretion of OFAC, and OFAC ma[kes] the
decisions based on foreign policy objectives in conjunction with the State department,
there [is] no justiciable standard for evaluating the specific licensing decisions and they
[cannot] be disturbed as a matter of law."); Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y
Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 516 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59 (D.D.C. 2007)
("[B]ecause no justiciable standard for evaluating OFAC's specific licensing decisions
exists, the Court concludes 'agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."')
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
314 OFAC FAQ, supra note 34, at 76. Reversals of previous denials of license
applications are extremely rare, however. Werner Interview, supra note 24.
315 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(4) (2012).
316 Werner Interview, supra note 24. Companies engaged in more global,
repeatable activity sometimes receive more detailed explanations to aid their navigation
of issues presented by a particular sanctions program, but those explanations are usually
given orally. Id. These oral explanations are consistent with OFAC's hesitancy to
publish any formal guidelines by which it makes specific licensing decisions. See supra
text accompanying note 313.
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D. The "Core Competencies" of OFAC Licensing
While OFAC's licensing practices may be opaque, they
provide OFAC with the ability to maximize the efficacy of U.S.
sanctions programs. There are three general attributes or "core
competencies" associated with OFAC licensing that optimize U.S.
sanctions: (1) the ability to operate flexibly, (2) the ability to
mitigate collateral damage, and (3) the ability to adapt to changed
circumstances in the target of a sanctions program.
1. Flexibility
Perhaps the most important aspect of OFAC's licensing
practices is the ability to operate flexibly. This flexibility is
apparent in many areas. For instance, OFAC has leveraged
licensing to manage conflict-of-law situations.317 The
extraterritorial application of certain U.S. sanctions programs,
such as the Cuba sanctions, can adversely affect the interests of
subsidiaries of U.S. businesses operating in countries that allow
trade with Cuba and its people."'1 As mentioned in Part III.A
above, several countries have gone so far as to enact "blocking
laws" that prohibit entities under their jurisdictions from
complying with U.S. sanctions programs.3 19 Canada,320 the EU,32 1
317 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
318 See generally SPADONI, supra note 75, at 97-127 (analyzing how Helms-Burton
has affected foreign investors and foreign companies with major business activities in
Cuba); see also Boscariol, supra note 74, at 448 ("U.S. Congressman Robert Torricelli,
one of the leading supporters of the 1992 CDA, estimated that U.S. trade with Cuba
through foreign subsidiaries fell from U.S. $718 million in 1991 to only U.S. $1.6
million in 1992 as a direct result of the implementation of [the CDA].").
319 See supra Part III.A.
320 An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA), S.C.
1996, c. 28 (Can.).
321 Council Regulation 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-
Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based
Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC). The EU's negative response
to the United States' extraterritorial Cuba sanctions stands in contrast to its adoption of
most of CISADA's provisions, thus precluding conflicts over extraterritorial U.S.
enforcement, at least with respect to EU businesses in the majority of cases. See EU and
Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1251-54 (comparing the U.S. and EU measures
and explaining the contrast with the EU's reaction to the Cuba sanctions as a factor of
economic, security, and political circumstances).
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and Mexico322 each have blocking or anti-boycott laws in place to
counteract U.S. sanctions against Cuba, for example.3 23  As a
result, situations can arise where a foreign subsidiary of a U.S.
company is faced with a Morton's Fork: Comply with OFAC
regulations and face prosecution by the business's country of
operation, or comply with local obligations and risk the imposition
of penalties by OFAC.324
On some occasions, these dilemmas are resolved by
enforcement action.325 More typically, however, they are resolved
by licensing.3 26 A U.S. company might indicate to its subsidiary
322 Ley de Protecci6n al Comercio y la Inversi6n de Normas Extranjeras que
Contravengan el Derecho Internacional [Act for the Protection of Commerce and
Investments from Foreign Policies that Contravene International Law], Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [DO], 22 de Octubre de 1996. The act prohibits persons within the borders
of Mexico from taking any action that "affects commerce or investment if those acts
correspond to the application of laws of foreign countries." Ryngaert, supra note 123, at
646.
323 Ryngaert, supra note 123, at 645-47, 662; see also Harry C. Clark, Dealing with
U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN.
L. 61, 81-87 (providing an overview of anti-boycott legislation in the EU, Canada, and
other countries).
324 See H. Scott Fairley, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The U.S. Embargo of Cuba
and Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Against It, 44 INT'L LAW. 887, 891-94
(2010) (discussing two examples of a Canadian subsidiary's dueling obligations on
account of its ownership by a U.S. company).
325 One of the more public examples of the FEMA/OFAC conflict involved a Wal-
Mart in Winnipeg, Canada and Cuban pajamas. In February 1997, a shopper at the
Winnipeg Wal-Mart notified the store that it had on its shelves pajamas marked "Made
in Cuba." Boscariol, supra note 74, at 462. Wal-Mart, upon instruction from its U.S.
parent company, pulled the Cuban pajamas from its shelves, and this action caught the
attention of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which
referred the matter to the Canadian Justice Department for possible prosecution under
FEMA. Id. A few weeks later, after consulting with its lawyers and Canadian officials,
Wal-Mart returned the pajamas to its shelves. Id at 463. What seems comical now was
undoubtedly a harrowing experience for the Winnipeg Wal-Mart. Mere hours after the
store restocked its shelves with the pajamas, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., stated publicly that
its Canadian subsidiary had deliberately defied instructions from headquarters to obey
the U.S. sanctions. Id. Despite the parent company's attempt to divorce itself from the
situation, OFAC announced that it was reviewing the situation and subsequently entered
into a settlement with the parent company for a $50,000 fine and no finding of liability.
Id.; Fairley, supra note 324, at 892. Situations like the Wal-Mart pajama crisis, where a
company faces a direct conflict between its obligations under U.S. and Canadian law,
and the enforcement agencies of both countries refuse to budge, are uncommon. Id.
326 Werner Interview, supra note 24; see also Fairley, supra note 324, at 892
(noting that these conflict of law scenarios are more frequently resolved non-
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operating in a jurisdiction that is subject to blocking legislation
that it is company policy not to do business with Cuba.327 The
subsidiary usually informs its home-state authority that it has
received such a directive and informs its parent that local law
precludes it from complying with OFAC sanctions. 3 28 The parent
company then alerts OFAC to the impasse, thus establishing the
"foreign sovereign compulsion defense," which allows both parent
and subsidiary to represent that they have complied as diligently as
possible with their home country's laws.3 29
In most cases, "papering this Mexican standoff' works.3 30
While the subsidiary may still face repercussions for violating
U.S. sanctions, OFAC will often grant a specific license in these
situations, provided that U.S. foreign policy does not militate in
favor of enforcing the sanction.331 Granting a specific license also
allows OFAC to closely monitor the subsidiary's trade with the
sanctioned jurisdiction per the reporting requirements of the
confrontationally and out of the public eye).
327 Fairley, supra note 324, at 892.
328 Id. This is required under Canada's FEMA, for example. Id.
329 Id.
330 Id. In some cases, however, specific licensing cannot resolve the conflict
effectively. This was the case in the early months of the United States' Libya sanctions
during the Arab Spring, where the volume of specific license applications filed in
response to the broad initial sanctions swamped OFAC's licensing division. See Lord et
al., supra note 7, at 280 (noting that the specific license requests "creat[ed] more demand
on an already over-burdened licensing department within OFAC"). In the spring of
2011, numerous sanctioning bodies targeted Libya, and these actors' regimes were often
inconsistent. See id. at 279-80 ("[The lack of] grandfathering or wind-down clauses
allowing the completion or payment of existing contracts . . . raised multiple practical
questions regarding transactions such as payment of customs fees to Libyan customs
authorities, letters of credit issued by Libyan banks, airline fares, crude oil aboard
vessels, ships in Libyan ports, payment due for goods and services already delivered or
received, and the like."). The U.S. sanctions were among the broadest, as they targeted
the Libyan government, yet the lack of an exemption for the completion of pre-existing
contracts placed many businesses in a position where they faced a breach of their
contractual obligations under non-U.S. law because their payment in U.S. dollars could
not clear American banks. Id. at 280. The only recourse for these businesses was to
request a specific license from OFAC, which placed serious burdens on OFAC's
licensing division. Id. Perhaps hoping to avoid this in Syria, OFAC's Syria sanctions
were bundled with a number of general licenses, one of which authorized the fulfillment
of pre-existing contractual obligations. See infra text accompanying notes 418-420
(discussing the 2011 Syria general licenses).
331 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
788
OFAC LICENSING AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
license, and OFAC retains the ability to revoke the license if it is
being abused (for example, if the U.S. parent company uses the
subsidiary merely as a means of circumventing OFAC
sanctions).33 2
OFAC also aspires to remain flexible with its sanctions by
granting specific licenses to inadvertent violators and persons
attempting in good faith to meet their obligations under the
regulations.3 Although it appears from OFAC's guidance that
even "inadvertent" violations of U.S. economic sanctions are
subject to penalties,3 34 OFAC's regulations make clear that it will
consider the willfulness or recklessness of the violation when
assessing penalties.3 35 In addition to its consideration of a
violator's state of mind as a mitigating factor, OFAC occasionally
issues specific licenses to allow inadvertent violators to reverse a
prohibited transaction.33 For example, OFAC's Iran sanctions
prohibit, among other activities, the purchase, sale, or
transportation of goods of Iranian origin.33 7 If, however, a person
purchased goods without knowing or having reason to know that
the goods were of Iranian origin, OFAC may grant that person a
specific license to allow him to dispose of the goods. 3
Further illustrating its flexibility, OFAC may use licensing to
allay the compliance concerns of persons doing business in
politically volatile situations where the distinction between a
sanctioned party and a non-sanctioned government or country
332 For a discussion of regulations put in place by the Canadian government to
prevent U.S. companies from using their Canadian subsidiaries as conduits for trading
with Cuba, see Fairley, supra note 324, at 893-94.
333 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
334 OFACFAQ, supra note 34, at 13 ("OFAC does not have an 'amnesty' program
[for inadvertent failures to comply]. The ramifications of non-compliance, inadvertent
or otherwise, can jeopardize critical foreign policy and national security goals. OFAC
does, however, review the totality of the circumstances surrounding any violation,
including the quality of a company's OFAC compliance program.").
335 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A, pt. 111 (2012).
336 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
337 Overview of OFAC Iran Sanctions Regulations, supra note 227. Notably,
however, 31 C.F.R. § 560.518 licenses domestic transactions involving goods of Iranian
origin located in the United States. 31 C.F.R. § 560.518 (2012).
338 Werner Interview, supra note 24. Such specific licenses are not guaranteed, and
OFAC may still assess penalties or require the person to forfeit the goods. Id.
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becomes blurred."' Such was the case in Lebanon following
Hezbollah's transition from a militia group to an influential
political party.34 0 Following the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the subsequent withdrawal of the
Syrian military from Lebanon,3 4' Hezbollah parlayed its military
power into a position of prominence in the Lebanese government,
culminating with the group's securing fourteen seats in the 2005
Lebanese parliamentary election.34 2 This action put companies
doing business in Lebanon in a precarious position. Although
OFAC does not administer a sanctions program against the
government of Lebanon, Hezbollah was, and remains, a
339 See Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 5081 (Jan. 25, 1999) (listing
Hezbollah as a designated entity); infra text accompanying notes 343-346.
340 Catherine Bloom, The Classification of Hezbollah in Both International and
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 61, 64-67 (2008)
(providing a historical overview of Hezbollah's rise to power in Lebanon).
341 On February 14, 2005, a massive bomb detonated in Beirut near Hariri's
motorcade, killing the former Lebanese prime minister. Susan Sachs, Rafik Hariri Is
Dead at 60; Ex-Premier of Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO4EIDDI23AF936A2575 1 COA9639
C8B63. Separate investigations conducted by CBC News and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, an international tribunal established to prosecute those involved in the
bombing, pointed to Hezbollah as the culprit. See Neil Macdonald, CBC Investigation:
Who Killed Lebanon's Rafik Hariri?, CBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.cbc.cal
news/world/story/2010/11/19/f-rfa-macdonald-lebanon-hariri.html; Janine Zacharia,
U.N. Court Indicts Hezbollah Members in 2005 Assassination in Lebanon, WASH. POST
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/un-court-indicts-
hezbollah-members-in-2005-assassination-in-lebanon/2011/08/17/gIQAv2KTLJ_
story.html. The initial U.N. investigation suggested the Syrian government was
primarily responsible. See Warren Hoge, U.N. Cites Syria as Factor in Lebanese
Assassination, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/25/
international/middleeast/25hariri.html?pagewanted= 1.
Hariri was a reformer and opposed the longstanding Syrian occupation of
Lebanon. Macdonald, supra. His assassination triggered the "Cedar Revolution," a
Lebanese political movement that sought to end Syrian influence in Lebanon. Id.
Syria's perceived responsibility for Hariri's assassination fostered an anti-Syrian
sentiment among the Lebanese people and led to the exit of Syrian forces from the
country. Bloom, supra note 340, at 65; Macdonald, supra. Coincidentally, this created a
military power vacuum that was filled by Hezbollah, the group now viewed as the most
likely perpetrator of Hariri's assassination. Bloom, supra note 340, at 65. Hezbollah
soon developed a presence in the Lebanese government, eventually winning fourteen
seats in the Lebanese parliament in 2005. Id. at 65-66.
342 Bloom, supra note 340, at 64-67 (2008) (providing a historical overview of
Hezbollah's rise to power in Lebanon).
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designated terrorist entity on OFAC's SDN List.3 43  Thus,
companies operating in Lebanon, such as those doing business
with Lebanon's central bank or state-owned enterprises, expressed
concern that OFAC may view such dealings as running afoul of
U.S. sanctions against Hezbollah. 34 As a measure of assurance to
such companies and so as to avoid suffocating legitimate business
in Lebanon and risk destabilizing the country, OFAC issued
specific licenses for transactions that did not run the risk of
furthering Hezbollah's extremist objectives.345  In doing so, OFAC
demonstrated a willingness to work with companies that make
good-faith efforts to comply with U.S. sanctions.346
2. Ability to Mitigate Collateral Damage
Because OFAC prefers to formulate its sanctions program
broadly, its economic sanctions can affect the lives of unintended
targets, such as ordinary citizens of foreign countries that have no
influence in their sanctioned government. 347  The broad reach of
U.S. sanctions can also unnecessarily put U.S. citizens and
companies at a competitive disadvantage, undermine international
support for the sanctions programs, and even undermine the policy
objectives of the programs.3 48 One way in which OFAC mitigates
343 See Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 5081 (Jan. 25, 1999) (listing
Hezbollah as a designated entity). Hezbollah is also a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist as well as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED
PERSONS 208 (2011).
344 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
345 Id
346 This willingness was demonstrated again with Libya in 2011. Recognizing the
potential for confusion raised by the United States' sanctioning of the Libyan
government and its affiliates, OFAC attempted to provide clarity through numerous
general licenses, while at the same time urging businesses not operating under a general
license to submit applications for specific licenses. Lord et al., supra note 7, at 279.
347 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
348 Id. Then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright acknowledged this reality in her
March 17, 2000 remarks before the American-Iranian Council regarding U.S. sanctions
in Iran, in which she announced that the Clinton administration was easing certain
sanctions affecting Iranian businesspeople. See Madeline K. Albright, Secretary, U.S.
Dep't of State, Remarks Before the American-Iranian Council: American-Iranian
Relations (Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/news/iran/2000/000317.htm.
She noted, "The purpose of our sanctions ... is to spur changes in policy. They are not
an end in themselves, nor do they seek to target innocent civilians." Id.; see also
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the collateral damage of its holistic sanctions is by issuing licenses
that permit U.S. citizens to export food and medical supplies349 and
provide humanitarian aid350 to people in sanctioned countries. In
an effort to avoid placing private enterprises at an unnecessary
competitive disadvantage, which can damage U.S. influence
internationally and U.S. interests as a whole, OFAC may also
allow certain activities from an otherwise sanctioned country.3 51
Additionally, OFAC issues licenses to avoid interfering with the
legitimate activities of international and charitable organizations
and to permit U.S. persons to participate in such organizations. 35 2
By licensing these types of activities and transactions, OFAC
focuses its sanctions and the punitive consequences thereof, to the
extent possible, on those in a position to produce the desired
change, rather than on innocent civilians and businesses.3 53
The TSRA generally prohibits the President from unilaterally
banning or controlling the export of agricultural commodities,
medicine, or medical devices to sanctioned countries.35 4 In
HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 13, at 138 (observing that "[c]omprehensive sanctions are
blunt instruments" and "their economic impact often causes substantial collateral damage
to the populace at large and sometimes neighboring countries").
349 See infra notes 354-363 and accompanying text (discussing the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act).
350 See, e.g., OFAC, CUBA TRAVEL LICENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 302, at 36-38
(providing guidance on applying for a license to travel to Cuba for purposes of "certain
humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba designed to directly benefit the Cuban
people, including but not limited to medical and health-related projects; construction
projects intended to benefit legitimately independent civil society groups; environmental
projects; projects involving formal or non-formal educational training, within Cuba or
off-island, on topics including civil education, journalism, advocacy and organizing,
adult literacy, and vocational skills; community-based grass roots projects; projects
suitable to the development of small-scale private enterprise; projects that are related to
agricultural and rural development that promote independent activity; and projects to
meet basic human needs"); OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS REGULATIONS: FUNDS TRANSFERS TO IRAN FOR
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AFTER MARCH 25, 2004 (2004) (authorizing for a "ninety-day
period ... donations of funds directly to US-based non-governmental organizations
('NGOs') specifically licensed by [OFAC] to be used in direct support of humanitarian
relief and reconstruction activities being undertaken in Iran in response to the earthquake
in Bam").
351 Werner Interview, supra note 24; see infra text accompanying notes 368-72.
352 See infra notes 364-367, 374-377 and accompanying text.
353 See Albright, supra note 348.
354 The TSRA defines unilateral sanctions as those imposed by the United States
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contrast with the broad discretion afforded to the President under
TWEA and IEEPA, the TSRA is an example of Congress limiting
the President's foreign policy discretion by prescribing a specific
framework within which the President may impose export
controls.355 If the President wishes to impose such unilateral
sanctions, he must submit a report to Congress describing the
proposed restrictive measures and the actions by the targeted
country that justify the restrictions, and Congress must approve the
report by joint resolution.35 6
The TSRA contains important exceptions to its general
prohibition on unilateral agricultural and medical supplies
sanctions."' The first of these exceptions exempts from the rule
countries in which the United States has military involvement,
whether through a declaration of war, a statutory authorization of
the use of military force, or other general hostilities.35 8 The TSRA
also generally exempts arms control and nonproliferation
sanctions.359 Another important exemption requires exporters of
agricultural or medical commodities to designated state sponsors
of terrorism to obtain a license before exporting such goods.360
State sponsors of terrorism are designated by the State Department
outside of a multilateral regime in which other countries have agreed to impose
substantially equivalent measures or those imposed without a mandatory decision from
the U.N. Security Council. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
(TRSA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-2702 (2006).
355 See Parvin Huda & Eric Clark, Destined for Terror: Coping with the Most
Restrictive of U.S. Export Controls Embargoes, Terrorist-Supporting Countries,
Designated Terrorists, and Sanctioned Persons, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS
2011, at 313, 332 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 943, 2011).
Congress similarly restricted the President's discretion with respect to sanctions with the
so-called Berman Amendment, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502, 102 Stat. 1107, 1371
(1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4) (2006)), and the Free Trade in Ideas Act
(FTIA), Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 95a, 50 U.S.C. § 1702). See Chin, supra note 301, at 1891-93 (discussing
the passage of the Berman Amendment and the FTIA). The Berman Amendment created
an "informational materials" exemption to the President's authority to regulate imports
and exports under TWEA and IEEPA. Id. at 1891. The FTIA clarified Congress's intent
that the informational materials exemption be construed broadly. Id. at 1893.
356 TRSA § 7202.
357 See id § 7203.
358 Id. § 7203(1).
359 See id. § 7203(2).
360 Id. § 7205(a)(1).
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and currently include Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.36 1 TSRA
exports to such countries, or entities within such countries, can
only be made pursuant to one-year licenses.36 2 OFAC administers
this licensing process with respect to Iran and Sudan.363
Commonly, sanctioning entities exclude humanitarian exports
like agricultural and medical commodities, from their controls,
though this exclusion often occurs through blanket
authorizations. * The TSRA licensing system appears to hold an
advantage over boilerplate statutory or regulatory exemptions in
that it allows the United States to closely monitor humanitarian
exports to countries that threaten U.S. foreign policy interests.36 5
For instance, OFAC can deny license applications where it finds
that a TSRA application requests a license to export goods to an
entity that OFAC determines is actually a front for a designated
terrorist group.366 At the other end of the spectrum, OFAC may
determine that the individual review of TSRA license applications
is no longer necessary, as it did with Sudan in 2009, and issue a
general license authorizing such exports.3 67
361 State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/r
Is/crt/2011/195547.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). Notably, however, Syria is exempt
from this license requirement. TRSA § 7205(a)(2).
362 Id. § 7205(a)(1).
363 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of2000 (TSRA) Program,
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Pages/tsra.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2013); see also Huda & Clark, supra note 355, at
327-31 (charting the division of licensing responsibilities between the Commerce and
Treasury Departments).
364 See, e.g., The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Asset-Freezing)
Regulations, 2011, S.I. 2011/1094, 9 (U.K.) (including a typical U.K. licensing
provision); The Egypt (Asset-Freezing) Regulations, 2011, S.I. 2011/887, 9(2) (U.K.)
(including the same). EU sanctions almost always contain provisions requiring Member
State competent authorities to grant exemptions for humanitarian needs, extraordinary
expenses, and legal fees. See, e.g., Council Regulation 359/2011, art. 4, 2011 O.J. (L
100) 1, 3 (EU); Council Regulation 765/2006, art. 3, 2006 O.J. (L 134) 1, 2 (EU).
365 Werner interview, supra note 24.
366 Id.
367 Id. In September 2009, to resolve a statutory conflict, OFAC amended the
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations to authorize all TSRA exports to Southern Sudan and
other specified areas of Sudan. See Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg.
46,361 (Sept. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 538). The lifting of trade
sanctions on those areas of Sudan through the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of
2006 and the implementing executive order conflicted with the TSRA's licensing
provisions, which at the time required OFAC to license agricultural and medical supply
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To avoid economic harm to individuals and businesses that
have no influence in a targeted government's activities, OFAC
will exempt certain types of transactions from an otherwise
comprehensive ban."'8 For instance, in 2000, OFAC issued a
general license authorizing the importation of Iranian-origin
foodstuffs, carpets, and related transactions.3 6 9 This licensure was
part of the United States' overtures toward Iran during the end of
the Clinton administration, through which the United States
attempted to foster goodwill between Iranians and Americans
while still maintaining restrictive measures targeting the Iranian
government as reprisal for its nuclear program and sponsorship of
terrorism.37 0 Though pistachio, caviar, and carpet exports may
compose a relatively small portion of Iran's overall trade, the
authorization of these imports surely gave a boost to the private
Iranian businesses that produce these goods."' It also may have
restored some cultural ties between the United States and Iran.372
exports to the specified areas of Sudan even though, under the new statutory regime, "no
OFAC authorization was required to export most other items to those areas." Id. at 46,
361-62.
368 See Iranian Transactions Regulations: Licensing of Imports of, and Dealings in,
Certain Iranian-Origin Foodstuffs and Carpets, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,642 (May 3, 2000).
369 See id. ("The Treasury Department is amending the Iranian Transactions
Regulations to add general licenses authorizing the importation into the United States of,
and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets and related transactions.").
370 See Albright, supra note 348 (remarking on these objectives); David Stout, U.S.
to Drop Longtime Ban on Luxuries from Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/15/world/us-to-drop-longtime-ban-on-luxuries-from-
iran.html ("[T]he Clinton administration, eager to encourage moderation in the land
where the United States has been reviled as the Great Satan, is about to ease some import
bans on Iranian consumer goods: pistachios, caviar and carpets.").
371 See Stout, supra note 370 ("The value of the pistachios, caviar and carpets may
be relatively small in terms of Iran's overall trade but it is significant for the boost it can
give to private Iranian entrepreneurs by pumping much-needed hard currency into their
country, administration officials said.").
372 See id. ("The move may also affect another kind of currency, less definite but no
less real, in the United States: the social cachet that comes from being able to buy things
that have been largely forbidden since the shah of Iran was driven from the Peacock
Throne in 1979."). As then-Secretary of State Albright put it, the authorization of these
imports was "designed to show the millions of Iranian craftsmen, farmers and fisherman
who work in these industries, and the Iranian people as a whole, that the United States
bears them no ill will. . . . [and that] the United States will explore ways to remove
unnecessary impediments to increase contact between American and Iranian scholars,
professional artists, athletes, and non-governmental organizations[, which] ... will serve
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OFAC's licensing practices additionally reflect a desire to
prevent U.S. economic sanctions from interfering with the
legitimate humanitarian and diplomatic activities of charitable
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)373  and international
organizations like the U.N.3 74 or from unduly restricting the ability
of U.S. persons to transact with foreign diplomats.3 75  The
activities of these organizations and diplomats may be aimed at
brokering peace, developing international trade, providing
humanitarian aid, and other endeavors consistent with U.S. foreign
policy.3 76  Yet without licenses from OFAC, U.S. citizens would
often be prohibited from working for international organizations
dealing with sanctioned countries.
On a case-by-case basis similar to specific licensing, OFAC
issues registration numbers to NGOs that allow registered
organizations to conduct humanitarian or religious activities in
countries or areas subject to economic sanctions.3 78 The permitted
transactions for registered NGOs are sometimes specified by a
to deepen bonds of mutual understanding and trust." Albright, supra note 348.
Of course, just as OFAC may dial down a sanctions program with improving
international relations, it may tighten them again when relations turn sour. With the
enactment of CISADA, the importation of Iranian pistachios, carpets, and caviar is again
prohibited. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,611 (Sept. 28, 2010)
("[OFAC] is amending the Iranian Transactions Regulations . .. to remove general
licenses authorizing the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain
foodstuffs and carpets of Iranian origin and related services, and to implement the import
and export prohibitions in section 103 of [CISADA]."); see also Joe Palazzolo, Iran
Sanctions Means Return to 'Persian-Style' Rugs, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/27/iran-sanctions-means-return-to-
persian-style-rugs ("American living rooms will lament Sept. 29, 2010: the day Persian
carpets ceased flying into the U.S. legally. That's when a ban on 'carpets and other
textile floor coverings and carpets used as wall hangings' of Iranian origin takes effect,
as part of a package of sanctions issued by the U.S. against Iran over its nuclear
program.").
373 See infra notes 378-379 and accompanying text.
374 See infra text accompanying notes 380-382.
375 See infra notes 384-387 and accompanying text.
376 For example, as discussed below, a general license under the U.S. Iranian
sanctions allows U.S. persons to conduct the official business of the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Health Organization ("WHO"), among other
institutions. See infra text accompanying notes 381-382.
377 See infra text accompanying notes 381-382.
378 See Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(c).
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published statement of licensing policy under the sanctions
program for which the registration number is issued; in other
cases, OFAC will specify the permitted activities directly in its
letter issuing the registration number.379 In addition, in connection
with many of its sanctions programs, OFAC has issued general
licenses permitting U.S. persons to conduct transactions with
sanctioned countries on behalf of international organizations.3"o
For instance, OFAC's Iran sanctions program has a general license
in place that authorizes U.S. citizens employed by the U.N., the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, International Labor Organization, or the
World Health Organization to perform "transactions for the
conduct of the official business of' those organizations.3 81 OFAC
issued this general license "[i]n light of the U.S. interest in
promoting the hiring and retention of Americans by international
organizations."382
Aside from using general licenses to permit the involvement of
U.S. persons with certain international organizations, OFAC also
issues general licenses to facilitate third-country diplomatic
missions to sanctioned countries as well as the diplomatic
missions of some sanctioned countries to the United States.8
General licenses issued under the Syria sanctions program typify
379 Id. § 501.801(c)(1). OFAC requires extensive information from NGO
registrants, including the identification of any field offices, subcontracting organizations,
sources of income, financial institutions holding deposits on behalf of the NGO, as well
as a detailed description of the NGO's humanitarian or religious activities in the
sanctioned countries or geographic areas. Id. § 501.801(c)(2). NGOs that receive a
registration number must reference that number in all documentation and transactions
related to the authorization provided by its registration. Id § 501.80 1(c)(3).
380 See, e.g., id. §§ 537.509, 560.539 (authorizing "transactions and activities
otherwise prohibited by this part that are for the conduct of the official business of the
United States Government, the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International
Monetary Fund"). The IMF's stated objectives include promoting international monetary
cooperation, international trade, and exchange stability. See INT'L MONETARY FUND,
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. I, at 2 (2011). In its latest budget, the WHO indicated such
objectives as reducing the health, social, and economic burdens of communicable
diseases and combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. See WORLD HEALTH
ORG., PROGRAMME BUDGET 2012-2013, at 20-32 (2011).
381 Id
382 Iranian Transactions Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,795, 48,796 (Aug. 22, 2006)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 560).
383 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
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these facilitative measures.3 84 General License No. I under the
Syria sanctions, for example, authorizes, with limited restrictions,
"[t]he provision of goods or services in the United States to the
diplomatic missions of the Government of Syria to the United
States and the United Nations and payment for such goods or
services."3 85 Additionally, General License No. 8 authorizes
employees, contractors, and grantees of the U.N. and its
"Specialized Agencies, Programmes, and Funds" to perform
transactions for the conduct of the official business of those U.N.-
related entities.386 Finally, General License No. 12 authorizes
"U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in
securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters . . . to process
funds transfers for the operating expenses or other official
business of third-country diplomatic or consular missions in
Syria," so long as the transfer does not in any way involve the
Syrian government or a person designated on the SDN List.8
These general licenses demonstrate OFAC's desire to avoid
interference with U.S. foreign relations. A frequent goal among
U.S. sanctions programs is to incentivize political or social change
in a targeted country. By issuing general licenses that facilitate the
dealings of international organizations, sanctioned countries'
diplomats in the United States, and American and third-country
diplomats in sanctioned countries, OFAC avoids frustrating the
efforts of individuals and entities that share that same goal.
384 Id.
385 Syria General License No. 1: Syrian Diplomatic Missions to the United States
(2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria
gll.pdf. The license is conditioned on the goods or services not being for resale and
being for "the conduct of the official business of the missions, or for the personal use of
the employees on the missions." Id. The transaction must also not involve real property
and cannot otherwise be prohibited by law. Id.
386 Syria General License No. 8: Official Activities of International Organizations
(2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria
gl8.pdf. "Specialized Agencies, Programmes, and Funds" include all entities listed on
the United Nations organizational chart. See U.N. Dep't of Public Info., The United
Nations System, U.N. Doc. DPI/2470 rev.2 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.un.org/e
n/aboutun/structure/pdfs/unsystem chart colour sm.pdf.
387 Syria General License No. 12: Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Funds
Transfers (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/syria gll2.pdf
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3. Adaptability
The third core competency of OFAC's licensing practices is
the ability to adapt a particular sanctions program quickly in
response to political or circumstantial changes.38 8 In situations
where sanctions goals can change with the tides of revolution, the
slow march of legislative and rulemaking processes may be
incapable of producing a timely response. Sanctions targeting
government-owned or government-operated entities may need to
be lifted in response to a positive regime change or re-imposed in
the event that the new government fails.389 OFAC often utilizes
general licenses to manage these fast-paced scenarios, either by
easing sanctions through license adoption or strengthening
sanctions through license revocation.390 By issuing or revoking
general licenses, OFAC can react to the changing political
circumstances of a targeted country without requiring a regulatory
overhaul or the signing or withdrawal of an executive order.39 1
The sanctions imposed against the Palestinian Authority in the
wake of the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections illustrate
OFAC's use of licensing to adapt to changed circumstances.3 9 2 As
388 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
389 Id.
390 Id.
391 Id. OFAC's ability to adapt its sanctions regulations was apparent in the wake
of the 2009-2010 Iranian presidential election protests. The protests, which were in
reaction to what many Iranians saw to be a fixed presidential election, demonstrated the
important role social media can play in providing support to pro-democratic movements.
See Brad Stone & Noam Cohen, Social Networks Spread Defiance Online, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2009), at All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/
middleeast/16media.html. OFAC's Iran sanctions at the time generally prohibited the
sale or supply to Iran of the software necessary for the "exchange of personal
communications . .. over the Internet." See Cuban Assets Control Regulations;
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Iranian Transactions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,997,
10,998 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515, 538 & 560). To ensure that
the Iran sanctions would not chill the free exchange of information over the Internet in
that country, OFAC issued a general license "authoriz[ing] the exportation . .. of certain
services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the
Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and e-mail, social networking, sharing of photos
and movies, web browsing, and blogging." See id OFAC found that similar
considerations applied with respect to its Sudan and Cuba sanctions, and the agency
similarly licensed Internet communications-related software under those programs. See
id. at 10,998-99.
392 See Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations; Terrorism Sanctions Regulations;
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discussed in Part IV, in the 2006 West Bank and Gaza elections,
Hamas, an OFAC designated terrorist organization, won the
majority of the Palestinian parliamentary seats from the U.S.-
supported Fatah party, led by Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas."' With Hamas and its nominated Prime
Minister Ismail Haniya gaining control of the Palestinian
Authority, OFAC determined that Hamas had a property interest in
Palestinian Authority transactions.394 This determination resulted
in the blocking of Palestinian Authority assets and transactions.395
After numerous incidents of violence in early 2007, Hamas took
control of the Gaza Strip.3 96 In response, President Abbas
dissolved the unity government, dismissed Ismail Haniya, and
appointed Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister.39 7 With the effective
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 61,517 (Oct. 31,
2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 594-95, 597).
393 Erlanger, supra note 278.
394 See Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations; Terrorism Sanctions Regulations;
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,199 (May 10,
2006) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 594-95, 597) ("OFAC has determined that, as a
result of the recent elections, HAMAS has a property interest in the transactions of the
Palestinian Authority. Accordingly . .. U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in
transactions with the Palestinian Authority unless authorized.").
395 See id. As discussed above, this initial freeze was accompanied by a group of
general licenses permitting certain transactions with the Palestinian Authority. See supra
text accompanying notes 279-284.
396 Conal Urquart, Ian Black & Mark Tran, Hamas Takes Control of Gaza, THE
GUARDIAN (June 15, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/15/israel4.
397 Isabel Kershner & Steven Erlanger, Gaza Turmoil Prompts Abbas to Dissolve
Government, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/world/
middleeast/14cnd-mideast.html; see also Abbas Sacks Hamas-Led Government, BBC
NEWS (June 15, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/6754499.stm ("Mr[.]
Abbas will now rule by presidential decree until the conditions are right for elections.").
Hamas scoffed at Abbas's assertions of control and continued to control Gaza, while the
Palestinian Authority controlled the West Bank. Al Fatah, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/f/fatahal/index.html
(last visited Jan. 13, 2013). In May 2011, Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation
accord and planned to hold elections for another unity government within a year. Ethan
Bronner, Palestinian Factions Sign Accord to End Rift, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/middleeast/05palestinians.html. Though the
elections were planned for May 2012, internal Hamas divisions have stalled the process
indefinitely. See Ethan Bronner, Mideast Din Drowns Out Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/world/middleeast/arab-spring-and-
iran-tensions-leave-palestinians-sidelined.html (observing that the Arab Spring and
Iran's nuclear program have diverted the United States and Israel from assisting political
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separation of Hamas from the Palestinian Authority, OFAC issued
a general license authorizing U.S. citizens to engage in all
transactions with the Authority. 398
The United States' use of economic sanctions in response to
the 2011 Libyan civil war provides a more recent example of the
use of general licenses to adapt to a rapidly evolving situation.39 9
On February 25, 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order
13,566 (EO 13,566), which prohibited all dealings by U.S. persons
in the assets of certain named members of the Muammar Gaddafi
regime, any person that the Treasury Secretary designated, and
generally all persons involved in the political oppression of the
Libyan people.4 00 Additionally, EO 13,566 froze the assets of and
prohibited U.S. persons from transacting with the Government of
Libya, its agencies and controlled entities, and the Central Bank of
Libya.40 ' In imposing these sanctions, however, the Obama
administration understood that such broad measures could
eventually become unnecessary and even harmful to a new Libyan
government.4 02 Thus, as is commonplace with U.S. sanctions, EO
13,566 authorized the Treasury Department to issue licenses as
well as delist designated persons.40 3
The broad Libya sanctions triggered a torrent of specific
progress in the Palestinian territories).
398 See Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations; Terrorism Sanctions Regulations;
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 61,517, 61,517
(Oct. 31, 2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 594-95, 597) ("Based on foreign policy
considerations resulting from recent events in the West Bank and Gaza, including the
appointment of Salam Fayyad ... and of other ministers not affiliated with HAMAS,
OFAC is revising [its counterterrorism sanctions] to add a new general license ...
authoriz[ing] U.S. persons to engage in all transactions with the Palestinian Authority.").
Nevertheless, OFAC's original determination that Hamas has a property interest in the
Palestinian Authority remains in place; thus, should the political situation in the
Palestinian territories change, OFAC can simply revoke the general license. See id.
("Following the 2006 parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza, ... OFAC
determined that HAMAS had a property interest in the transactions of the Palestinian
Authority. That determination remains in place.").
399 See Exec. OrderNo. 13,566, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,315, 11,315-18 (Feb. 25, 2011).
400 See id § 1.
401 See id. § 2.
402 See id. (explaining in its preamble that the sanctions are intended as a response
to the violence perpetrated against the Libyan people by the Gaddafi regime and to
prevent the misappropriation by Gaddafi loyalists of Libyan state assets).
403 See id. at §§ 6, 11.
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license applications, many of which concerned the same
acceptable practices.4 04 Thus, OFAC initially used its licensing
power to issue general licenses responding to the common issues
addressed in the specific license applications it received.40 5 These
general licenses included authorizations of transactions with
financial institutions controlled by the Libyan government but
were organized under the laws of another country,406 transactions
involving the provision of goods and services to the Libyan
government's diplomatic missions,4 07 transactions for certain legal
services,408 and transactions incident to the normal operations of
investment funds that had sanctioned persons as non-controlling
minority investors.4 09
As the Libya conflict abated and the Gaddafi regime became
less of a threat to the Libyan people, OFAC issued numerous
general licenses that restored normal economic relations between
the United States and Libya.4 10 Indeed, approximately one month
after the commencement of NATO operations,4 11 OFAC issued a
general license permitting transactions related to certain oil, gas,
and petroleum exports from Libya occurring under the auspices of
the Transitional National Council of Libya (TNC),4 12 a then-
404 See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 279-91 (providing a detailed account of the
general licenses issued through the progression of the Libyan civil war).
405 Id. at 279-80.
406 Identification of Nine Entities Pursuant to Executive Order 13,566 and
Amendment of General License No. lA, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,404 (proposed June 21, 2011).
407 Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,562, 38,566-67 (July 1, 2011)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 570).
408 Id. at 38,566.
409 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13566 OF FEBRUARY 25, 2011 BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO LIBYA, GENERAL LICENSE No. 4: GUIDANCE AND GENERAL
LICENSE WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT FUNDS IN WHICH THERE IS A BLOCKED NON-
CONTROLLING, MINORITY INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA (2011) [hereinafter
OFAC, LIBYA SANCTIONS]; Lord et al., supra note 7, at 280-82, 284-85 (summarizing the
provisions of these licenses).
410 See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 286-91 (summarizing the general licenses under
the Libya program issued during the rise of the new Libyan government).
411 See Holmes, supra note 11.
412 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13566 OF FEBRUARY 25, 2011 BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO LIBYA, GENERAL LICENSE No. 5: AUTHORIZING
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO CERTAIN OIL, GAS, OR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS EXPORTED
802 Vol. XXXVIII
2013 OFAC LICENSING AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 803
emerging anti-Gaddafi group which France had recognized as the
sole representative of the Libyan people. 413 In August 2011, to
reconcile the United States' recognition of the TNC as the
legitimate governing authority in Libya with the contemporary
sanctions targeting the Libyan government, OFAC issued a license
generally authorizing all transactions with the TNC.4 14 Following
the fall of Tripoli, moreover, OFAC licensed transactions with the
Libyan government and central bank.4 15  Finally, in December
2011, OFAC issued a general license freeing the remainder of
those entities' assets.4 16 While these general licenses reduced the
force of the U.S. sanctions against Libya, EO 13,566 remains in
place, and thus OFAC retains the flexibility to ratchet up its
sanctions should a change in Libyan politics militate such
action.417
Though the Syrian uprising in many ways resembled the
concurrent Libyan civil conflict, OFAC took a markedly different
FROM LIBYA (2011).
413 Libya: France Recognises Rebels as Government, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 12699183.
414 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, LIBYAN
SANCTIONS REGULATIONS, 31 C.F.R. PT. 570, EXECUTIVE ORDER 13566 OF FEBRUARY 25,
2011 BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO
LIBYA, GENERAL LICENSE No. 6: GUIDANCE AND GENERAL LICENSE WITH RESPECT TO THE
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LIBYA AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNING AUTHORITY
FOR LIBYA (2011).
415 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, LIBYAN
SANCTIONS REGULATIONS, 31 C.F.R. PT. 570, EXECUTIVE ORDER 13566 OF FEBRUARY 25,
2011 BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO
LIBYA, GENERAL LICENSE No. 8A: GENERAL LICENSE WITH RESPECT TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF LIBYA, ITS AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND CONTROLLED ENTITIES, AND THE
CENTRAL BANK OF LIBYA (2011).
416 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, LIBYAN
SANCTIONS REGULATIONS, 31 C.F.R. PT. 570, EXECUTIVE ORDER 13566 OF FEBRUARY 25,
2011 BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO
LIBYA, GENERAL LICENSE No. 11: GENERAL LICENSE UNBLOCKING THE GOVERNMENT OF
LIBYA, ITS AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND CONTROLLED ENTITIES, AND THE
CENTRAL BANK OF LIBYA, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS (2011).
417 See Libya Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/libya.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (listing
EO 13,566 and the general licenses currently in place). The current status of the Libya
sanctions reflects the fact that it is easier for OFAC to issue or revoke a license than it is
to reinstate a terminated sanctions program. Werner Interview, supra note 24.
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approach with the al-Assad regime.4 18 In Syria, six general
licenses accompanied the release of EO 13,582.419 Several of
these licenses, such as those authorizing transactions with Syrian
diplomats and the provision of certain legal services, mirrored the
licenses issued under the Libya program; others anticipated
activities that, in the absence of a general license, would have been
the subject of burdensome specific license requests.42 0
Recognizing the role social media played in the 2009 Iranian
election protests, one general license allows the export of certain
services incident to Internet-based personal communications.4 2'
This strategy suggests that OFAC learned from its experience with
Libya, where the agency had scrambled to address a wave of
specific license applications with responsive general licenses.42 2
As some commentators have argued, the United States'
approaches in the Libya and Syria programs suggest that OFAC
may couple the imposition of future sanctions initiatives with
appropriate general license carve-outs, the revocation or limitation
of which could easily adjust the scope and severity of the
restrictions, as exigencies warrant.423
418 Werner Interview, supra note 24.
419 Id
420 See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 295-98 (summarizing the first ten of these
general licenses). Fifteen general licenses are currently in place in OFAC's Syria
sanctions program. See Syria Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/syria.aspx (last
visited Jan. 13, 2013) (listing fifteen general licenses under the Syria sanctions).
421 See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 296; OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, GENERAL LICENSE No. 5: EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN SERVICES
INCIDENT TO INTERNET-BASED COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORIZED (2011).
422 Lord et al., supra note 7, at 279-80.
423 See id. at 276, 298-99. Based on their analysis of the Libya and Syria sanctions,
Jeff Lord and his colleagues conclude that the U.S. government has shown a willingness
to use sanctions to foster regime change, "crafting and eventual[ly] lifting . . . sanctions
to provide meaningful support to rebel groups." Id. at 276. In Libya, the United States'
response, which began with severe sanctions targeting the Gaddafi-controlled Libyan
government that were eventually reduced once the TNC assumed control, demonstrated
the United States' ability to distinguish between political movements within a single
country and to react with appropriate sanctions. Id. at 298-99. In Syria, the United
States took a more measured approach, first targeting individuals to signal its opposition
to the human rights violations that were occurring, and only imposing broad,
government-targeted measures when the narrowly targeted sanctions failed. Id. at 299.
The expanded sanctions were nonetheless accompanied by a series of general licenses
that anticipated the compliance problems experienced in Libya. Id.
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V. Conclusion
The United States' response to the Arab Spring has affirmed
its affinity for economic sanctions as a powerful, versatile answer
to intolerable state behavior.424 In particular, the U.S. approach to
the civil unrest in Libya and Syria illustrates that it is increasingly
willing to use economic sanctions to separate governments from
their people and to provide meaningful support to rebel groups.4 25
In contrast to past situations in which it has acted unilaterally,
moreover, the United States has not been alone in its resort to
sanctions to influence political change in the Middle East.426 The
Arab League 427 and the EU also imposed holistic sanctions in
response to the crises in the region.4 28 In imposing holistic
The United States utilized similarly adaptive sanctions in the Palestinian
territories in 2006 and 2007, where it blocked the Palestinian Authority's assets when
Hamas assumed control, crafted licenses to minimize collateral damage to friendly
individuals still in power, and broadly authorized transactions with the Palestinian
Authority following its split from Hamas, while at the same time leaving the
infrastructure in place to reinstate sanctions should a reversion to a hostile Palestinian
government occur. See supra notes 392-398 and accompanying text. Labeling these
types of restrictive measures "smarter sanctions," Lord and colleagues posit that the
United States' sanctions activity in connection with the Arab Spring suggests "a more
flexible, nearly nimble, and quickly changing approach to [U.S.] sanctions policy,"
where comprehensive sanctions can be quickly scaled back, and targeted sanctions can
quickly tighten into comprehensive embargos. See Lord et al., supra note 7, at 298-99.
Though potentially effective in striking a balance between draconian and inflexible
sanctions regimes like the Cuba embargo and the pointed yet often toothless "smart"
sanctions that have been in vogue for the last decade and a half, such rapidly changing
sanctions programs pose significant challenges for compliance practitioners. See id. at
299 (pointing out such challenges and noting that effective compliance will require
"careful attention to the rapidly changing aspects of these regimes" and "maintaining
good relationships" with sanctioning agencies "in order to acquire informal guidance or
suggestions in ambiguous situations"). The available empirical evidence is at this time
insufficient to support any firm conclusions as to whether the Arab Spring sanctioning
strategies are simply a product of circumstance or indicative of a fundamental change in
the way OFAC approaches sanctions.
424 See supra Part I.
425 Lord et al., supra note 7, at 276.
426 See infra notes 427-428 and accompanying text.
427 See Neil MacFarquhar, Isolating Syria, Arab League Imposes Broad Sanctions,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/world/middleeast/
arab-league-prepares-to-vote-on-syrian-sanctions.html (describing the Arab League
measures as "a battery of economic sanctions meant to sever most trade and investment
from the Arab world, an unprecedented step against a member state").
428 The United Nations has had more difficulty than its supranational counterparts
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measures in Libya42 9 and Syria,430 the EU deviated from its stated
preference for "smart" sanctions.43 1 In addition, the EU aimed
broad and severe sanctions at Iran for its nuclear program,
restrictions which nearly equaled those imposed under
CISADA.432
in forging consensus on Arab Spring-related sanctions. While the Security Council
managed to agree to freeze the assets of Libya's central bank, Russian and Chinese
vetoes have thus far prevented it from responding to the Syria crisis with sanctions. See
Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on
Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/
world/middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html; Patrick
Worsnip, U.N. Sanctions Lifted on Libya's Central Bank, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/us-libya-assets-un-idUSTRE7BF2IN201112
16.
429 See Samuel Rubenfeld, EU Announces Sanctions on Libyan Oil Companies,
Iranian Human Rights Abusers, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/
corruption-currents/2011/04/12/eu-announces-sanctions-on-libyan-oil-companies-
iranian-human-rights-abusers (arguing that EU sanctions against over two dozen Libyan
energy firms constitute "a de facto embargo on oil and gas" in Libya, and reporting
measures already in place targeting Libya's central bank and sovereign wealth fund).
430 See Laurence Norman, EU Hits Syria with Fresh Sanctions, WALL ST. J. (July
23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 100008723963904434375045775444205
35408762.html ("The EU has already launched 16 rounds of sanctions on Syria as the
death toll has surged in the violence there, including a ban on Syrian oil exports and an
asset freeze and travel ban on many top officials...."); Bruno Waterfield, EU Agrees
Further Syria Sanctions, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9108153/EU-agrees-further-Syria-sanctions.html
(reporting the freezing of the assets of Syria's central bank).
431 The EU sanctions policy guidelines updated in 2009 trumpet the cause of
"smart" sanctions, directing that "[t]he measures taken should target those identified as
responsible for the policies or actions that have prompted the EU decision to impose
restrictive measures." Council Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of
Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and
Security Policy No. 17464/09 of Dec. 15, 2009, 14. According to these guidelines,
targeted sanctions "are more effective than indiscriminate measures and minimise
adverse consequences for those not responsible for such policies and actions." Id. at 6.
432 In 2010, less than a month after the United States enacted CISADA, the EU
issued Council Decision 2010/413, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 39, which largely mirrors
CISADA's severe Iran sanctions. EU and Secondary Sanctions, supra note 120, at 1251.
Council Decision 2010/413 prohibits an array of transactions and related financing and
financial assistance to Iran's energy sector, mandates government oversight of funds
transfers to Iran not falling under a limited humanitarian exemption, and includes, among
other restrictions, a catch-all provision requiring EU banks to "exercise vigilance" in
ensuring that transactions in which they are involved are not contributing to Iran's
nuclear program. Id. at 1251-52; Helder, supra note 177, at 404-05; Rubinoff &
Aminian, supra note 171, at 231-32.
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Should the civil unrest in the Middle East spread to other
countries or regions in the future, the experience of the Arab
Spring suggests that multinational bodies like the EU and the Arab
League will increasingly join the United States in availing
themselves of holistic sanctions to address such situations. 4 3 3 To
ensure the efficacy of their sanctions regimes, these and other
sanctioning actors must implement an infrastructure that fosters
the three core competencies that are endemic to the U.S. approach:
flexibility, the ability to mitigate collateral damage, and
adaptability. 434
A sanctions strategy that promotes these core competencies
will be able to navigate the conflict of law issues that arise. It will
be prepared to mitigate the damaging effects of sanctions on
innocent civilians and businesses. Additionally, it will be more
able to respond quickly and cohesively to rapidly changing
political circumstances. In short, a strategy that cultivates the
three core competencies will be positioned to optimize the impact
of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy.
433 See MacFarquhar, supra note 427 (describing the Arab League measures as "a
battery of economic sanctions meant to sever most trade and investment from the Arab
world, an unprecedented step against a member state"); see Rubenfeld, Clinton Names
Waiver Recipients, supra note 120 ("Clinton cited the European Union embargo [against
Iran] ... as 'solidarity' with the U.S. and 'their commitment to holding Iran accountable
for its failure to comply with international obligations."').
434 See supra Part IV.D. In a forthcoming article, the authors argue for the
implementation of a centralized licensing program in the emerging EU sanctions regime
that accounts for the three core competencies. See Court E. Golumbic & Robert S. Ruff
III, Who Do I Call for an EU Sanctions Exemption?: Why the EU Sanctions Regime
Should Centralize Licensing, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013).
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